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           The Military Housing Privatization Initiative (MHPI) represents a dramatic 
revision in the construction and maintenance of military housing. The Basic Allowance 
for Housing (BAH) initiative is also a long waited major step towards providing an 
adequate quantity and quality of living quarters for service members and their families.  
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construction (MILCON) and BAH and analyzes the interrelationship among them. This 
project studied the examples of the Presidio of Monterey/NPS and the Hickam AFB 
housing privatization projects in details. 
 
             The research concludes that MHPI is a valuable and flexible tool for bridging the 
gap between existing housing needs and what the Government has been able to provide 
through traditional military construction. Since many long-term uncertainties exist 
regarding DOD’s future housing needs and the resulting effect of the BAH initiative, this 
project recommends capitalizing on the strength of each housing tool (BAH, MHPI) 
through a more integrated approach to ensure that the military’s housing needs are met as 
efficiently as possible. A better coordination on housing initiatives appear to be 
important, since housing allowances could rise in some areas, thereby making more local 
housing affordable to service members and lessening the need for renovation and 
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A. RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
The purpose of this paper is to examine the defense department’s military housing 
privatization initiative and the need for change. the paper gives a general overview of the 
initiative and gives detailed examinations of two military housing privatization projects, 
focusing on the presidio of Monterey/naval postgraduate school, Monterey, California 
and the Hickam AFB, Honolulu, Hawaii projects. it also profiles and compares the 
distinctly different approaches taken by the air force, army, and navy. 
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
What is the Military Housing Privatization Initiative (MHPI), and what are the 
program’s original objectives? 
What is the reliability of Life Cycle Cost Analyses conducted by various 
organizations so far? 
How are two initiatives (MHPI and BAH) interrelated with each other, and what 
are the impacts of this interrelation? 
What are the different approaches used by services when solving their Military 
Family Housing (MFH) problems. 
What are the risks, benefits and costs of the Presidio of Monterey/Naval 
Postgraduate School project? 
What are the risks, benefits and costs of the Hickam AFB project? 
C. SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS 
1. Scope 
This paper will encompass a review of the MHPI program and it’s objectives. It 
will give a general overview that led to the creation of the MHPI program, will also 
describe the historical legislative basis of the program. It will examine the BAH 
initiative, a sister program of the MHPI and the effects that they exercise on each other. It 
will give an understanding of budget scoring problem as well as the service’s different 
theoretical approach to the housing problem.  It will examine the deficiencies of previous 
cost and benefit analyses. Included in the scope are two military housing privatization 
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project analyses. This data and information then forms a basis for an evaluation of the 
effectiveness of the two programs and the Military Housing Privatization Initiative as 
general respectively. 
2.  Limitations 
While this paper includes a variety of financial and other numerical data, it is not 
intended to be a detailed cost and benefits analysis of the MFH issue. Rather it is 
intended to concentrate on some aspects, facts, and concepts that may provoke critical 
thinking and may suggest new considerations and approaches to MFH problem. 
D. METHODOLOGY 
This paper is based on an extensive literature review, including other theses, 
congressional testimonies, Defense Department and Service component internal papers, 
reports, policies and plans, articles and web searches. Other sources of information 
involved personal interviews and communications of different representatives involved in 
the projects. 
E. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY 
This paper is organized into seven chapters. Chapter II provides the basic 
understanding of the MHPI and the problems associated with it. Chapter III provides an 
in-depth review of the different approaches of the Air Force, Army, and Navy. Chapter 
IV describes financial funds of the MFH and gives a review of previous cost and benefit 
analysis and the usefulness of that kind of assessment at the initial phase of the program. 
Chapter V and Chapter VI provide an analysis of the Presidio of Monterey/Naval 
Postgraduate School and the Hickam AFB projects respectively. Finally Chapter VII 
summarizes the conclusions of the authors and provides recommendations for what 
identified problems should be paid attention when planning future projects. 
F. BACKGROUND 
1. General Background 
During the past four decades, housing for military personnel and their families has 
been a relatively low priority component of military construction. After a rapid expansion 
of what was then considered modern and up-to-date accommodations throughout 
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the1950s and the early 1960s, the effort devoted to the construction and the upkeep of 
military housing did not keep up with the effects of natural deterioration and changing 
societal definitions of adequate housing. The decrease in quality of housing has 
accelerated since the end of the Cold War as a result of the uncertainties of base closures, 
both at home and overseas, and shrinking defense budgets, which have encouraged the 
channeling of construction funds into projects more directly related to operational 
readiness.  
The Department of Defense (DOD) spends about $8 billion annually to provide 
housing for families of active-duty military personnel. Seeking to provide military 
families with access to adequate, affordable housing, DOD either pays cash allowances 
for families to live in private sector housing or assigns families to government-owned or 
government-leased units. The housing benefit is a major component of the military’s 
compensation package. DOD Housing Management Manual 4165.63M states that private 
sector housing in the communities near military installations will be relied on as the 
primary source of family housing. About 544,000, or two-thirds, of the military families 
live in private housing. These families receive assistance in locating private housing from 
housing referral offices at each major installation and are paid a cash housing allowance 
to help defray the cost of renting or purchasing housing in local communities. 
 For military housing itself, the Department of Defense (DOD) estimates that 
about 200,000 military family housing units are old, lack modern amenities, and require 
renovation or replacement. According to DOD, completing this work at current funding 
levels and using traditional military construction methods would take 30 years and cost 






Figure 1-1: DoD Substandard Housing 
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To improve housing more economically and faster than could be achieved if only 
traditional military construction funds were used, the Congress enacted legislation at 
DOD’s request authorizing the Military Housing Privatization Initiative, to allow private 
sector financing, ownership, operation, and maintenance of military housing. Under the 
program, starting in 1996, DOD can provide direct loans, loan guarantees, and other 
incentives to encourage private developers to construct and operate housing either on or 
off military installations. Service members, in turn, use their housing allowance to pay 
rent and utilities to live in the privatized housing. Although there can be exceptions, 
DOD’s position is that the government’s estimated total costs for a privatization project 
should be equal to or less than the total costs for the same project financed by military 
construction funding by taking advantage of the private sector’s investment capital and 
housing construction expertise. The Military Housing Privatization Initiative permitted 
DOD to enter into a variety of arrangements with private sector entities to build and 
renovate military housing both on and off military bases. DOD’s goal was to encourage 
private sector investment to obtain at least $3 in military housing improvements for each 
dollar that the government invested. 
Comparison of Military Construction and Family Housing Requests 
 FY 03 Request FY 04 Request 
Military Construction 4,054 4,480 
NATO Security Investment 
Program 
168 169 






Family Housing Operations & 
Maintenance 
2,877 2,780 
Homeowners Assistance 0 0 




Comparison of Military Construction and Family Housing Requests 
TOTAL 8,987 9,036 
 
Table 1-1: Comparison of Military Construction and Family Housing Requests 
 
For housing allowance, Congress approved DOD’s request for a new housing 
allowance program that started in January 1998. The program was designed to better 
match the allowance amount with the cost of housing by determining allowances on the 
basis of costs for suitable civilian housing in each geographic area and tying allowance 
increases to growth in housing costs. In January 2000, the Secretary of Defense 
announced a major new quality-of-life initiative to increase housing allowances, which 
would eliminate out-of-pocket housing costs entirely by year 2005. 
Quality housing is a key element affecting the quality of life of military members 
and their families. Because quality of life directly affects personnel retention and 
ultimately unit readiness, DOD states that adequate housing can enhance its efforts to 
maintain a ready, quality force. Yet, affordable housing is unavailable in the communities 
surrounding some military installations, and the poor quality of on-base housing is a 
long-noted problem. 
Common to all Services were concerns with compensation (including basic pay 
and the Basic Allowance for Housing, or BAH), quality of housing, and quality of 
environment in the workplace. BAH and quality of housing are closely intertwined. DOD 
can house approximately one-third of its military families in government owned units on 
military reservations. Those living off-base, either by choice or because of insufficient 
local government housing supply, pay commercial rates for utilities, such as water and 
sewer services, and rents or mortgages on their residences. 
2. Legal Background 
The MHPI is not the first attempt by Congress to create modern family dwellings 
quickly, nor is it the first time that Congress has encouraged DOD to partner with private 
industry. At least three separate approaches were tried during the Cold War, with varying 
degrees of success. The principal method has been reliance on the commercial housing 
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supply near military installations, and Congress has provided members with a cash 
allowance to defray part of the cost. The secondary method, intended for those locations 
where local housing is extraordinarily expensive or unavailable, has been to lodge 
members and their families in quarters built with appropriated funds on military 
reservations. In 1996, a third method was provided to DOD by Congress, the Military 
Housing Privatization Initiative (MHPI). 
a. Wherry Housing 
In 1949, Congress passed P.L. 81-221, which was intended to bring 
private homebuilders into the rental housing market for military personnel without 
requiring the use of military construction funding. As it was first implemented, the 
Military Services were allowed to solicit plans for housing from private builders. From 
those submitted, a Service chose the builder whose plan was deemed most suitable for the 
particular military facility. The builder arranged private financing and constructed homes 
on Government-controlled land for rental to military personnel. Later, in order to make 
the process more competitive, the program was changed so that a Service would contract 
with private architect-engineers for a standard set of housing plans at a designated 
military facility. Armed with these, the Services applied to the Federal Housing 
Administration (FHA) for an “appraisal and eligibility statement” that established a 
maximum insurable mortgage, effectively setting the high-end valuation for an individual 
housing unit. The Service then solicited bids for the project, which would be located on 
Government-owned or controlled land, from private housing developers. The lowest 
bidder was awarded a “certificate of need” which was used to apply to the FHA for 
mortgage insurance. Because private enterprise was, in essence, being issued a “license” 
to respond to a demonstrated market need using privately financed (albeit FHA-insured) 
housing, the developer retained title to the resulting real property and rented housing to 
individual Service members. The Wherry program supplied the greater portion of new 
military family housing constructed through the early 1950s, but congressional concerns 




b. Capehart Housing 
Like Wherry housing, Capehart housing was built on Government-
controlled land, exempting it from local building regulations. Unlike Wherry housing, 
where title to the resulting property remained with the private developer and individual 
Service members made rental payments to the owner. Capehart housing was built using 
private financing, but title was turned over to the Federal Government upon the 
completion of construction. In Wherry housing, individual members retained their 
housing allowances and paid rent to the private project manager, who was responsible for 
paying the project’s mortgage. Capehart housing was Government-owned, and members 
living there forfeited their entire housing allowances. DOD then made a single mortgage 
payment for a Capehart project to the private mortgager. By the early 1960s, DOD had 
constructed approximately 115,000 Capehart housing units. The last authorization for 
Capehart housing was made for Fiscal Year 1962. The construction of newer, larger 
Capehart units tended to draw tenants away from nearby Wherry housing. In 1957, the 
Services began purchasing the approximately 84,000 privately held Wherry units. Thus, 
both Wherry and Capehart housing eventually came under common administration and 
today are usually mentioned together as Capehart/Wherry. 
c. Section 801 and 802 Housing. 
These sections of Title VIII of the Military Construction Authorization 
Act of 1984 (P.L. 98-115) attempted to encourage the provision of privately constructed 
housing to military personnel by authorizing the Service secretaries to enter into contracts 
for the lease of facilities on or near military installations (Section 801, essentially a build-
to-lease guarantee to a local property developer), or to enter into agreements to occupy 
rental housing near military installations (Section 802, a rent guarantee to encourage the 
erection of rental property). The impact these arrangements had on Service budgets 
quickly discouraged their use. 
3. Military Housing Privatization Initiative (MHPI) 
Both Wherry and Capehart construction programs and the use of Section 801/802 
arrangements ended within a few years of their initiation. Although each attempted a 
different approach to providing housing and leveraging appropriated funds, none offered 
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more than very limited options for increasing the quantity and quality of the housing 
offered to the families of active duty military personnel. In 1996, Congress and DOD 
tried something very different. The Military Housing Privatization Initiative (MHPI) was 
devised to give the Department of Defense the ability to entice private investment by 
encouraging it to act like private enterprise. As businesses can be creative to take 
advantage of local real estate market conditions in customizing development projects, the 
MHPI was designed to give similar flexibility to DOD. This was intended as a step away 
from the perceived one-size-fits-all mentality of the earlier programs. Military Housing 
Privatization Initiative, was designed to improve military housing more economically and 
at a faster rate than could be achieved through traditional military construction funding 
by allowing private sector financing, ownership, operation, and maintenance of military 
housing. DOD asked the Congress to provide new authorities that would allow DOD to 
(1) provide direct loans and loan guarantees to private entities to acquire or construct 
housing suitable for military use, (2) convey or lease existing property and facilities to 
private entities, and (3) pay differential rent amounts in addition to the rent payments 
military tenants make. The new authorities would also allow DOD to make investments, 
both limited partnership interests and stock and bond ownership, to acquire or construct 
housing suitable for military use and permit developers to build military housing using 
room patterns and floor areas comparable to housing in the local communities. The 
authorities could be used individually or in combination. The Congress passed legislation 
containing 12 new authorities, and the initiative was signed into law on February 10, 
1996.  
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II. MILITARY HOUSING PRIVATIZATION INITIATIVE 
A. BASIC CONSIDERATIONS BEHIND THE MHPI 
The basic premise behind the initiative is for the military to use the private 
sector’s investment capital and housing construction expertise. DOD has noted that the 
private sector has a huge amount of housing investment capital. By providing incentives, 
such as loan guarantees or co-investments of land or cash, the military can encourage the 
private sector to use private investment funds to build or renovate military housing. Use 
of private sector capital can reduce the government’s initial outlays for housing 
revitalization by spreading costs—specifically increased amounts for housing 
allowances—over a longer term. As tenants in privatized housing, military occupants 
receive a housing allowance and pay rent. DOD’s goal is to encourage private sector 
investment in order to obtain at least $3 in military housing development for each dollar 
that the government invests. By leveraging government funds by a minimum of 3 to 1, 
DOD officials state that the military can revitalize three times as many housing units as it 
would with a military construction project for the same amount of money, thus allowing 
the housing problem to be solved three times faster. 
B.  MHPI IMPLEMENTATION 
Originally, the MHPI was centralized within the Department of Defense under the 
Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). Because of the complexity inherent in this new 
approach to military housing construction, the unfamiliarity of DOD contracting 
personnel with these kinds of negotiations, and new legal, financial, and budget issues 
that appeared as the program got underway, progress in the negotiation of contracts and 
in beginning construction was notably slower than originally envisioned. In October of 
1998, the Secretary of Defense devolved operational responsibility for MHPI to the 
individual Services, with oversight and final approval authority vested in the OSD Office 
of Competitive Sourcing and Privatization.  
C.  WHY DO WE NEED GOVERNMENT CONTRIBUTION TO MPHI ? 
When developing housing privatization projects, experience has shown that the 
total funds available between developer equity and available private sector financing is 
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normally less than the total development cost. This dynamic creates a development gap, 
which must be filled by various uses of our authorities.  
There are three basic causes of this development gap. First, consistent with the 
housing allowance initiative to eliminate out of pocket costs, housing privatization 
projects require the private sector developer to fund all development and maintenance 
costs based on the income provided by the rent paid by service members using their 
allowances, including utilities. Since these allowances are below market rents, an initial 
development gap is created. 
Secondly, junior enlisted members assigned to on base housing built with 
traditional military construction normally occupy single family houses with bedrooms 
based on number of dependents. The same junior enlisted living in private sector housing 
off-base may only be able to afford a rental apartment, usually with a lesser number of 
bedrooms. Privatization projects located on base require that developers build housing 
units, using market standards, but also equivalent to existing on base housing in type and 
number of bedrooms. To do otherwise would unfairly penalize service members living in 
on base privatized housing when compared to those living in government constructed 
housing on the same base. This discrepancy in housing that now the sevicemembers pay 
for as compared to what the developer is required to build further increases the 
development gap. 
The third factor that affects the development gap is based on unique risk, which is 
inherent to financing large housing projects on military bases. Private sector lenders are 
experienced in assessing the normal economic risks involved in housing development. 
However the risk associated with governmental actions (e.g., base closure, downsizing, or 
deployment) which might reduce the number of available occupants introduces 
uncertainty and can affect the availability, cost and amount of private sector financing. 
This either adds to project cost or decreases the amount of available financial resources, 
further adding to the development gap. 
The tools provided under the Housing Privatization law allow us to bridge this 
development gap. The most financially complex authority is the direct government loan. 
It is also a very efficient method to close the development gap. The primary advantage of 
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direct loans is that the amount of the loan is scored in the budget at a subsidy rate 
(normally 50-70%) determined by the interest rate and terms of repayment. 
A second financial method to fill a development gap is to provide a government 
equity investment. This method avoids some of the complexity involved in creating loan 
documents and credit monitoring, but is scored as the total amount of the investment and 
thus does not offer the same up front budget savings that use of a loan does. However, the 
government becomes a limited partner in the project and has the ability to create control 
mechanisms not available through use of the loan authority. The government also has the 
ability to share in any profits produced by the project. This authority is a central factor in 
the Navy projects. 
Lease or conveyance of property and transfer of existing units are two more 
authorities which are essential to making the projects work financially. Providing good 
existing units to a projects can increase the developer’s rental income stream (and hence 
the availability of private financing) without significantly increasing the development 
cost. Likewise, provision of property or housing stock can provide income to a developer, 
which offsets any development gap.  
The ability to provide Differential Lease Payments (DLP’s) is another authority 
which increases the income stream available to the developer, thus enabling more private 
sector financing and eliminating potential development gaps, without placing a burden on 
the military member through higher rents. The Navy has proposed use of DLP’s with 
some of their investment deals. DLP’s are scored as a net present value of the contractual 
commitment and are thus costly in budgetary terms. 
Loan guarantees covering base closure, downsizing and deployment are necessary 
in some markets to reduce risk based on these governmental actions as described earlier. 
When necessary, these guarantees ensure the availability of private financing and lower 
borrowing costs so that project income streams are sufficient to service that financing.  
These guarantees do not protect the lender from the standard risk of economic 
failure – the lender assumes and mitigates that risk through its underwriting policies. 
Other authorities help structure the housing privatization projects in ways that don’t 
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directly affect the initial development gap, but which reduce expenses over the life of the 
project. 
The ability to build in conformance with similar local housing units releases these 
projects from restrictions historically associated with military construction and allows 
private developers to achieve greater economies of scale, both in labor and material costs. 
Constructing to local standards results in a more cost-effective development and therefore 
a higher quality project. Additionally the privatization authorities allow ancillary 
supporting facilities, such as play areas and jogging trails, to be included in these projects 
to enhance the quality of life of the residents. DOD is interpreting this authority narrowly 
to mean facilities directly related to the housing and not widespread commercial 
development. Three authorities simply enhance execution of the projects once they are 
awarded. The first two of these allow requiring rents to be paid by allotment and allow 
assigning members to the units. Use of these authorities provides stability to the rental 
income stream and enhances private sector financing as well. We also have an interim 
lease authority that allows service members to occupy units incrementally in advance of 
conveyance as opposed to waiting for completion of all units in a project. 
Lastly, two authorities (build to lease and occupancy / rental income guarantee) 
are used to either lease units directly from a contractor or guarantee occupancy. These 




Figure 2-1: Possible Government Contributions in a Project 
 
D.  BASIC ALLOWANCE FOR HOUSING (BAH) 
Defense Department traditionally gives housing allowances to certain service 
members when on-base military family housing is not available. Service members then 
exercise their own discretion in purchasing or renting accommodations, in the 
surrounding community, that fit their budget and needs. BAH is funded through the 
annual Military Personnel (MILPERS) appropriation.  
The purpose of the Basic Allowance for Housing (BAH) program is to provide 
uniformed service members accurate and equitable housing compensation, based on 
housing costs in the local civilian housing market s near installations, and is payable 
when government quarters are not provided or available. Since the goal is to help 
members cover the costs of housing in the private sector, rental-housing costs in the 
private sector are the basis for the allowance. DoD determines the correct housing 
allowance to enable members to afford suitable rental housing within a reasonable 
distance of their duty location. For BAH purposes, “reasonable commuting distance” is 
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defined as generally within 20 miles or one hour driv e with rush hour traffic. The 
allowance amount is based on geographic duty location (by installation zip code), service 
member pay grade, and dependent status. (BAH Primer, 2002) 
1. Out-Of-Pocket (OOP) Expenses 
 BAH is designed to be fair for all service members in all locations in the United 
States. Although housing costs and BAH rates vary by location, average out –of pocket 
costs are designed to be the same for members of the same rank with typical rental 
expenses. The typical service member in a given grade and dependent status who arrives 
at a new duty station will have the same monthly out-of-pocket costs regardless of the 
location. For example, if the out-of-pocket cost for a typical E-5 with dependents is $106, 
the typical (median) E-5 with dependents can expect to pay $106 out-of-pocket for 
housing if assigned to Mia mi, New York, San Diego, or any duty location in the United 
States. (BAH Primer, 2002) However, for a given individual, the actual out-of-pocket 
expense may be higher or lower than the typical. For example, a service member who 
chooses a bigger or more costly home than the median will spend more out-of-pocket. 
The opposite is true if a service member chooses to occupy a smaller or less costly home. 
Only for the member with median costs do we say that out-of-pocket expense is the same 
for a given pay grade and dependent status in any given location. (BAH Primer, 2002) In 
his fiscal year 2002 Management Agenda, published by the Office of Management and 
Budget (OMB), President Bush proclaimed, “The Administration is committed to 
reducing to zero by 2005, the average out-of-pocket expense of military families living in 
private housing in local communities. This will enable more military families to leave 
inadequate government housing and rent quality private -sector housing in the local 




OUT OF POCKET EXPENSE RATIOS OF TOTAL HOUSING COST 
FY-01 15 % 
FY-02 11.3 % 
FY-03 7.5 % 
FY-04 3.5 % 
FY-05 0.0 % 
 
Table 2-1: Out Of Pocket Expense Ratios of Total Housing Cost 
 
2. Higher BAH Makes Privatization More Attractive 
 As BAH rates are increasing under the out -of-pocket elimination initiative, both 
developers and the services should find MHPI projects more feasible. Rising BAH 
reduces the need for DoD’s equity or loan contributions at project inception. With higher 
anticipated future cash flows from higher tenant BAH rates, private developers may find 
more private equity and loans available to them, at lower interest rates. This condition 
shrinks the development gap, reducing DoD’s upfront financial contributions to the 
project, decreasing budget scores, and increasing leverage ratios, making more financial 
resources available to fund other service priorities. 
 3. Higher BAH Reduces the Need for MFH 
Ironically, while higher BAH rates make MHPI projects more attractive to developers, 
and more feasible for DoD and installation leaders, they may also reduce the need for 
MFH. This phenomenon is explained through basic economic supply-demand theory. The 
potential effects of higher BAH rates are most dramatic near installations located in 
normal, functioning real estate markets (Hawaii, Monterey). Although higher BAH rates 
may have little or no effect in isolated locations, or in areas with severe building 
restrictions due to land or water shortages. 
4. Higher BAH Rates Make Private Rental More Affordable  
The BAH initiative seeks to eliminate the cost differential between MFH and Private 
Housing by 2005, making off base rentals more affordable. Many service members, who 
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previously sought on base housing, may now prefer and opt for a rental unit in the local 
private sector market, reducing the demand and need for DoD sponsored MFH, either 
MILCON or MHPI units. (GAO -01-684) 
E.  BUDGET SCORING 
The Budget enforcement act (BEA) of 1990 and the Federal Credit Reform Act (FCRA) 
of 1990 redesigned Federal budgeting and spending processes and were intended to limit 
spending and eventually reduce the ballooning Federal deficit. Congress, when 
authorizing money, and Federal agencies, when requesting funding, would have to 
include the sum of all future obligations in the budget year in which the program was 
authorized. Essentially, a current Congress cannot commit future congressional 
appropriations by authorizing funds for a long -term project without providing all/most of 
the funds in the year of authorization. Budget scoring dramatically changed the MFH 
landscape. 
1. Budget Scoring Defined 
The process of scoring or “scorekeeping” determines whether the total cost of a long-
term program (or how much of the total cost) is charged against the Federal budget in the 
program’s first year, or whether those program costs are spread out over the life of the 
program. Scoring/scorekeeping is the percentage of dollar value, from 0% to 100%, of a 
project’s cost that must be allocated to an agency’s budget in a given fiscal year. 
Therefore, if a project cost of $1 million is scored at 10%, then $100,000 of the agency’s 
budget authority for that year must be used to cover the assessment. The remaining 
$900,000 is applied to future years’ budgets, based on the scoring for each years’ 
commitments. A score of 100% would mean that all $1 million would have to be covered 
by the agency’s budget authority in the designated year, even if the contract called for 
actual payments of $50,000 per year , for 20 years. (Else, 2001) 
2. Budget Scoring for MHPI Projects 
Each of the authorities created for the MHPI has an associated budget score. The 
scoring used for the MHPI was drafted to comply with the Federal Credit Reform Act of 
1990 and the Budget Enforcement Act of 1990, as interpreted by Office of Management 
and Budget (OMB) Circular A-11 and specific MHPI Guidelines issued by the OMB on 
 17
June 25, 1997. These guidelines remained in effect for the first 20 projects using MHPI 
authorities, and w ill then be adjusted to incorporate lessons learned. The budget scoring 
percentages are calculated based on the Government’s “degree of exposure”, or the 
statistical probability that a contractor’s default on the project will have a financial 
impact on the Federal budget/deficit. (Else, 2001) 
Because of budget scoring, the MHPI tool or tools selected for employment in any 
given housing project have a significant influence on project’s budgetary impact. The 
amount of budgetary authority that must be allocated to a project is a direct function of 
those alternative authorizations selected for use. (Else, 2001) Appendix H arranges the 
twelve alternative authorizations in ascending order of budget impact and indicates those 
authorities used in the first sixteen MHPI projects with awarded contracts. 
Budget impact of the use of various authorities ranges from none, through 
moderate to high. Examples include; 
  a. Zero Budget Score: conveyance of non-revenue producing land or 
existing housing units to private developers. Because base land and existing housing units 
produce no revenue stream, and therefore have no impact on budget surpluses and 
deficits, the Budget Enforcement Act require that conveyance be scored at 0%, regardless 
of the market value of such real property. 
b. 4-7% Budget Score: provision of a loan guarantee. This scoring is 
calculated based on the Government’s “degree of exposure,” or the statistical 
probability that a default on the project by the private contractor will have a financial 
impact on the federal deficit.   
c.  30-40% Budget Score: direct loan to a contractor. This scoring is 
too calculated based on the Government’s “degree of exposure,” or the statistical 
probability that a default on the project by the private contractor will have a financial 
impact on the federal deficit.  
d. 70-100% Budget Score: guaranteeing a minimum tenant 
occupancy rate. This scoring assigns the Net Present Value of the annual BAH for the 




Because of budget scoring, the MHPI tool or tools selected for employment in any 
given housing project have a significant influence on its budgetary impact. The amount of 
budgetary authority that must be allocated to a project is a direct function of those 
alternative authorizations, either singly or in combination, that are used. Figure 2-2 
demonstrates alternative options for the use of authorities to fund a hypothetical MHPI 
project and their budgetary impact. 
 
Figure 2-2: Project Financing Example 
 
In this example, a hypothetical housing project requires capitalization of $40 
million in order to build 400 new family units. The private real estate developer selected 
by DOD to construct and manage the housing invests $4 million of his own money 
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(private developer equity) and is able to arrange an additional $30 million in mortgage 
financing through private banks. In order to complete the necessary funding for the 
project, the Department of Defense commits itself to cover the remaining $6 million 
value. This example presents four different ways that this can be accomplished using 
MHPI authorities, illustrating four very different effects on the DOD budget. 
Option 1 
In Figure 2 is a direct loan from the Federal Government to the developer. Under 
budget scoring rules, the $6 million loan is scored at 50 %, and $3 million must be 
allocated to the project from the annual DOD budget. 
Option 2 
Consists of conveying $6 million of market-value military family housing and 
land to the developer for his own use, perhaps as collateral for additional private 
financing for the project. Although this represents the loss of real property to the Federal 
inventory, it has no effect on the size of the Federal budget deficit, and budget scoring 
rules establish its impact on the DOD budget at $0. Therefore, no budget authority need 
be allocated to the project from the annual DOD budget. 
Option 3 
Offers Differential Lease Payments (DLP), direct cash rent subsidies, to the 
developer to make up the difference between what Service members would pay (the 
amount of their BAH) and local market rents for equivalent housing. Because this 
increases the commercial value of the project above that of straight BAH payments, the 
contractor may be able to secure better terms for his private funding. Budget scoring 
requires that the Net Present Value (NPV) of DLP be allocated against the DOD budget. 
In this example, the calculation incurs a $5 million budgetary burden. 
Option 4 
Illustrates the Government taking a $6 million equity (entering into a partnership) 
in the development project. Budget scoring rules require that an investment of this type 
be scored at 100 %. 
Therefore, four different alternative authorities used to cover the same $6 million 
development gap in a construction project can have four different impacts on the DOD 
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budget. In creating a real MHPI project, these authorities can use singly or in any 
combination. (Appendix A arranges the twelve alternative authorities in ascending order 
of budget impact. Appendix B explains the twelve alternatives.) 
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III. AIR FORCE, ARMY AND NAVY MHPI APPROACHES 
A. OVERVIEW 
As part of their commitment to improving the quality of life for service members 
and their families, the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps are committed to eliminating 
inadequate family housing by the end of fiscal year 2007; the Air Force will reach that 
goal within the continental United States in 2008 and overseas by 2009. Each military 
department has developed a Family Housing Master Plan that outlines, by year, what 
needs to happen to achieve these goals within the Department’s $4 billion annual budget 
for military housing. 
 
Number of Inadequate Family 
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Figure 3-1: Number of Inadequate Family Housing Units. 
 
Each Service created a plan for a series of innovative campaigns that orchestrated 
the management of assets, the distribution of family housing resources, and sequencing of 
investment projects. The goal would be accomplished through a combination of: 
1. Traditional Military Construction (MILCON) 
2. Basic Allowance for Housing (BAH) increases 
3. Privatization 
Across the Services, the basics of most housing deals remain the same. The 
Services agree to turn over up to 50 years worth of housing dollars in the form of BAH to 
commercial developers in exchange for building, maintaining, and managing housing on 
military installations. Developers can use this guaranteed income (BAH from military 
 22
members) to borrow millions of dollars from banks and other financial institutions. The 
contractors get a return on their investment with a profit by collecting housing allowances 
for as long as five decades. 
Throughout the implementation phase of the MHPI discernable patterns have 
emerged as each service component uses the flexibility the twelve authorities provided to 
pursue its unique MFH vision. The Air Force is taking a tentative approach, insisting all 
MHPI projects be ‘severable’ from the main installation, while still relying on MILCON 
for the majority of its housing needs. The Army is focusing on large installation 
privatization efforts under a whole-community concept and relying on MILCON at most 
of its smaller installations. The Navy is using Public -Private Ventures in an effort to 
obtain maximum financial returns for its housing investments and shorter contracts to 
maintain flexibility. The service components’ long-term strategies are outlined below and 
serve as the basis for analysis. Note that MHPI applies only to military installations 
within the United States and its territories and possessions, not to installations located in 
foreign nations. 
B.  AIR FORCE 
The Air Force Center for Environmental Excellence (AFCEE) administers the 
MHPI for the Secretary of the Air Force through their Housing Privatization Office 
(HPO). The AFCEE-HPO describes its plan as a program that matches Air Force 
requirements to real estate market opportunities to provide the best value housing, 
maximizing developer creativity, and returning a transaction with a high potential for 
successful completion. Under this MHPI plan, private developers own the housing units, 
located on private land or land leased from the Air Force, and Air Force personnel 
receive BAH and pay rent to the private developer. Rents are less than BAH rates, with 
the difference accounting for a utility allowance, designed to keep out -of-pocket 
expenses at zero for the average tenant. The developer manages and maintains the 
property for 50 years. Tenants pay utilities directly to the utility provider without 
government or developer involvement. (AF -HPP, 2004) 
The Air Force uses three criteria to determine the appropriate investment strategy 
for revitalizing housing at each base. If all criteria are met, privatization is generally 
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selected. If any one of the three criteria is not met, the traditional MILCON option is 
generally selected. 
1. Severability. The Air Force requires privatized family housing to be 
physically separate (either geographically separate or severable) from other installation 
functions. To be eligible for privatization, it must be possible, but not required, to place a 
fence around the housing area and to obtain access to the area from a public road. This 
ensures that if, at a later date, the demand by military families is insufficient to fill 
housing, alternate civilian renters could access the housing estate without entering the 
operational portion of the installation. (AF -HPP, 2004) This is a significant difference 
between the Air Force’s MHPI approach and that of the Army and Navy. 
2. Economic Feasibility – ‘Scored’ Cost. The privatization candidate must 
obtain the minimum three to one leverage ratio required by DoD policy. The scored cost, 
under OMB guidance, cannot exceed one-third of the estimated MILCON cost to 
complete a project of identical scope. (AF -HPP, 2004) 
3. Economic Feasibility – Life Cycle Costs. The LCC associated with 
privatization must be less than the LCC for an identical MILCON project. The Air Force 
defines the MHPI LCC as the sum of the OMB scored costs and the net present value 
(NPV) of the expected BAH paid to service members living in the privatized units. 
Government ownership LCC is the sum of the MILCON construction costs and the NPV 
of all estimated future costs for maintenance, repair, utility, management and any other 
services provided over the life of the units. (AF -HPP, 2004) 
Although the Air Force believes MHPI is a key element to eliminating inadequate 
MFH, it intends to use traditional MILCON methods to accomplish most of its MFH 
revitalization. MILCON will renovate 45,650 units or 71% of the remaining inadequate 
units inventory. Host Nation construction programs in Japan and South Korea will 
revitalize an additional 3,398 inadequate units, with traditional MILCON used for other 
overseas requirements, mainly in Germany, Japan and South Korea. After completing all 
MHPI projects, 34,364 MFH units will reside under privatization, representing 30% of 
the total Air Force MFH inventory, having served to upgrade about one-third of the 
originally inadequate units. The Air Force plans 251 construction and renovation 
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projects, with 36 (14%) being MHPI and 215 (86%) being MILCON. (AF - HPP, 2004) 
The Air Force averages 968 units per MHPI deal. Major General Earnest Robbins, who 
oversees the Air Force’s MHPI program, admits that his service’s more tentative 
approach to MHPI precludes it from meeting the DoD OSD guidance to eliminate 
inadequate MFH by 2007. He expects the Air Force to eliminate inadequate housing by 
2010, primarily due to predicted MILCON funding shortages necessary to upgrade Air 
Force owned/operated units. Robbins says the Air Force prefers a “balanced approach,” 
preferring privatization only at bases located in strong commercial housing markets, and 
intending to reinvest savings from MHPI projects into other MILCON projects. Robust 
commercial housing markets ensure the Air Force and developer could easily obtain 
civilian tenants or sell the housing units if the Air Force no longer needs them. (Cahlink, 
2001) 
The Air Force plans to privatize a total of 34,364 units under 34 different MHPI 
projects, representing 30% of its total MFH inventory. In 2004 the total Air Force 
housing inventory stands at approximately 104,937 units, including 64,239 Air Force 
owned and operated, 14,100 Host Nation owned and 26,598 owned by MHPI partners. 
The total Air Force MFH inventory of 104,937 units included some 40,000 inadequate 
units worldwide. So far in 27 projects 26,598 units have been conveyed as part of the 
MHPI projects. Revitalizing the remaining inadequate units was estimated to cost $5 
billion through traditional MILCON methods, and would take at least 20 years at current 
funding levels. (See Appendix C for list of approved Air Force Projects) 
C.  ARMY 
 After several studies, the Army chose Residential Communities Initiative (RCI) as 
its program. The goal of RCI is to eliminate inadequate Army housing in the United 
States by 2007. The three main objectives are: 
1. Create world class, quality residential communities 
2. Leverage assets/scarce funds 
3. Obtain private sector expertise, creativity, innovation and capital. 
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Under the umbrella of the Residential Communities Initiative (RCI) the Army’s 
whole base concept seeks to develop entire communities, not just housing units. The 
Army establishes long term (50 year) business relationships with private sector 
developers for the purpose of improving entire base communities. Within this holistic 
approach, one developer hired the same architect who designed the Olympic village for 
the summer games in Sydney, Australia. The Army provides long-term interests in the 
form of both land leases and existing MFH asset conveyance to the developers. In turn, 
the developers become whole-community managers and receive tenants BAH as rent. 
Under the RCI, the Army will establish long-term business relationships (usually 
50 years) with private sector developers for the purpose of improving military family 
housing communities. The Army will provide the developer a long-term interest in both 
land and family housing assets. These developers will become the master community 
developers for the Army community. The primary source of financial return for the 
developers will be the revenue stream generated from the military personnel’s basic 
allowance for housing (BAH) which will be paid as rent. The Army-developer 
relationship is not essentially a contractual one. When the Army RCI PM speaks of 
“long-term business relationships,” he is describing limited liability corporations or a 
limited liability partnership.  
The Army has developed an aggressive privatization program. The current plan 
for the Army includes 34 RCI Projects to be transferred to Residential Community 
Initiative partners by 2007. Additional installations continue to be evaluated for 
privatization that would expand the program to 45 installations (95 percent of 
government owned Army Family Housing in CONUS). The Army maintains a worldwide 
inventory of 122,977 MFH units, and predicted a need for 127,048 units by 2009. The 
AFH inventory for FY 2003 is 93,435 owned units, 15,727 privatized units, and 13,815 
leased units. These 122,977 units are located at 112 installations in the United States 
(91,193 units), Europe (28,360 units), Japan (981 units), Korea (1,774 units), and 669 
units leased at various locations worldwide. About 80 percent (73,477 units) of the US 
owned inventory of 91,299 units will be privatized. The current Army Family Housing 
Master Plan contains about $560 million for government equity contributions to support 
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privatization projects from FY 2002 through FY 2005. The breakout of requirements is 
$143,0 million, $153,5 million, $120,4 million and 142,7 million in FY 2002 through FY 
2005, respectively (AFHMP 04-09).  
Although its first MHPI contract was not awarded until September 1999, the 
Army has fully embraced housing privatization as the best way to solve the MFH 
problem, quickly and efficiently. The Army is moving forward rapidly with plans to 
entirely privatize most of its large installations, eliminating all inadequate MFH by 2007. 
The Army plans MILCON projects at overseas locations and smaller CONUS 
installations. The Army averages 2,564 MFH units under each MHPI contract (AFHMP 
04-09). 
The Army will invest approximately $224 million from AFHC funds in the first 
12 projects, and the developers will provide over $4.25 billion in private capital during 
the initial development period (4-10 years). Private capital consists of developer equity 
and debt underwritten by the BAH income stream, (debt being the main source of 
financing). (See Appendix D for list of approved Army Projects) 
 
Up-Front Government
Investment - $224 M
Initial Development




Figure 3-2: The Army’s contribution versus initial development 
 
D.  NAVY AND MARINE CORPS 
 The Navy pioneered the MHPI effort in 1994 when it obtained authority from 
Congress to create Public-Private Ventures (PPV) as a way to correct its housing 
problems. The PPV authorities, originally granted to the Navy only, were included in the 
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1996 MHPI legislation and made available to all services.  Under this venture, a private 
company (typically a limited liability company) builds, maintains, and manages family 
housing communities in a partnership with the service. The Navy and Marine Corps view 
privatization not only as a way to improve housing, but also as an investment 
opportunity. By forming limited liability companies with developers, the PPV 
arrangements require the Navy to accept a greater financial burden, but enable it to share 
in the revenues generated by the project. (Cahlink, 2001) The Navy’s revenue share is 
negotiated up front and may be used for repairs, reserve accounts, or for housing needs at 
other Navy locations. The limited liability companies can be used for developing housing 
on Navy bases and Government land, as well as on private land. The partnerships include 
many of the features pursued by other services, such as using housing allowances to pay 
for on base housing. But the agreements also make use of other Congressional 
authorities, such as allowing the services to invest in non-government entities and convey 
excess land to private developers. These deals do not allow the land to be sold and are 
often 50-year arrangements that end with housing transferred back to the Navy and 
Marine Corps (Cahlink, 2001). 
While some Navy deals are for 30 to 50 years, with the housing reverting to Navy 
control at termination, some are also much shorter, with provisions to sell the property on 
the open real estate market. The shorter deals, at smaller bases and encompassing fewer 
units, are for ten to fifteen years and allow for the sale of individual units as early as the 
sixth year of operations. Current residents have purchase priority and may be offered 
reduced closing costs and relief from real estate commissions. When the deal reaches full 
term, the PPV liquidates the remaining units on the open market. Because it is a full 
business partner in the PPV, with a significant financial stake, the Navy receives a 
substantial portion of the liquidation proceeds if there is any. These proceeds may be 
reinvested in another local PPV if a housing shortage still persists, or they may be 
invested in a PPV at a different Navy base with MFH shortages. 
There are several key features to the PPV according to the Navy-Marine Corps. 
These features include: 
1. Zero out-of pocket expenses to the service members 
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2. Military construction quality or better for the privatized housing 
3. The elimination of the renovation/replacement backlog 
4. Guaranteed operation and maintenance in the long run 
5. Future renovations/replacements will be fully funded by a given project 
6. Services reserve accounts are established to fund future uncertainties 
7. The services participate in all key management decisions 
Navy predicts a housing need for 68,499 units by 2005. Revitalizing the 
inadequate units was estimated to cost $3.8 billion using solely traditional MILCON 
funding and would take at least 20 years to complete. (Navy - FHMP, 2001) By 2005, the 
Navy plans to complete 18 PPV deals at eleven bases, with some bases having two or 
three different PPV contracts to account for all of the privatized housing. (Navy-FHMP, 
2001) The Navy plans to convey 8,669 adequate units to PPV between 2001 and 2010. 
PPV renovates 5,144 inadequate units (27% of 18,801), while MILCON renovates 
13,657 units (73 % of 18,801). New PPV construction replaces 3,739 (67% of 5,569) 
demolished units, while MILCON replaces 1,830 (33% of 5,569) demolished units. PPV 
and MILCON will demolish and not replace 3,373 inadequate units at bases with excess 
capacity. Between 2001 and 2010, PPV reduces the overall MFH deficit at underserved 
bases by 3,844 units (88% of 4,361) through new construction, while MILCON reduces 
the MFH deficit by only 517 units. (Navy-FHMP, 2001) The Navy averages 1,221 units 
under each PPV agreement. These Navy figures do not include the Marine Corps MFH  
 (Navy-FHMP, 2001). (See Appendix E for list of approved Navy and Marine Corps 
Projects) 
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IV. PRIVATIZATION FUNDS AND PREVIOUS ANALYSES 
OF COSTS AND BENEFITS 
A. PRIVATIZATION FUNDS 
 1.  MFH Programs Paid by MHPI Funds 
 Defense Department’s share within the Federal Government’s budget. 
 
Figure 4 - 1: The Federal Budget 
 
Congress funds the Defense Department’s budget through yearly appropriations. 
Since 1960, the Defense Department’s budget has been divided into seven appropriations 
titles: 
1. Military Personnel 
2. Operations and Maintenance (O&M) 
3. Procurement 
4. Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation (RDT&E) 
5. Military Construction (MILCON) 
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6. Family Housing (MFH) 





Figure 4 - 2: Military Family Housing as a Percentage of the Defense Budget 
 
The Family Housing title is sub-divided into four major functional categories: 
1. Construction (New, Post-acquisition, Planning and Design) 
2. Operations and Maintenance (including utilities) 
3. Debt Payments 
4. DoD Family Housing Improvement Fund (funds MHPI) 
Both the new construction and the post-acquisition functional categories of the 
Military Family Housing appropriation title are specifically earmarked by installation and 
by project. (FMR, June 2002) Funding for the Military Housing Privatization Initiative is 
accomplished through two funds established by the 1996 authorizing legislation: the 
DOD Family Housing Improvement Fund and the DOD Military Unaccompanied 
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Housing Improvement Fund including in the former functional category. The funds can 
receive sums by direct appropriations and transfers from approved military construction 
projects and from proceeds from the conveyance or lease of property or facilities. The 
funds are used to implement the Initiative, including the planning, solicitation, award, and 
administration of privatization contracts. 
2.  MFH Programs Paid by MILCON and O&M Funds 
Congress maintains significant visibility and control over funds that support 
traditional MFH. The yearly National Defense Authorization Act appropriates specific 
funds for each service component, for both family housing MILCON and family housing 
O&M. This MFH support funding is strictly separated from other MILCON and O&M 
funds, and must be requested for specific projects and specific installations. 
MILCON funds are sub-divided by 
- New construction and 
- Major renovation projects. 




- interest payments 
- mortgage insurance 
- currency fluctuations 
- reimbursements 
MILCON funds remain available for obligation for five years after appropriation, 
while O&M funds must be obligated in the year for which they are appropriated. Service 
components and installations have no freedom to redirect MFH funds to better meet their 
needs. Once appropriated by Congress, the funds must be used for that specific purpose 
for which they were appropriated and that purpose only.  
3. MFH versus Private-Sector Housing 
Within the last ten years, several studies examined the relative costs of on-base 
MFH provided through the installation commander, as compared to housing provided 
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through the private sector obtained from the local economy. Although the studies varied 
in their computations and percentage differentials, all studies concluded that on-base 
MFH is more costly than private sector housing provided to service members through 
housing allowances. The most comprehensive and frequently cited study is the CBO 
study, which computed the average annual long-term costs for comparable housing units. 
(CBO, 1993) 
 




Amortized Cost of Capital 4400  
School Impact Aid 1900  
Cost of Land 500  








Table 4 – 1: Average Annual Long-Term Costs for Comparable Housing Units. 
 
This data indicates that, in aggregate, MFH is 41% more costly than its 
comparable private sector counterpart (9200 x 1.41 = 13000). DoD’s BAH initiative to 
eliminate OOP expenses by 2005 will make DoD responsible for the $1,700 paid by the 
service member. Although DoD’s proportion of the total cost will change, the 
comparative, aggregate costs will not change. The $1,700 paid by the service member 
would be under BAH title. Operations and maintenance includes utilities, minor repairs, 
and local housing management operations. Cost of capital is based on a 57-year service 
life, including construction costs and one major renovation. School impact aid is the 
difference between what DoD pays for students who reside on base but attend off base 
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schools, and the increment paid for students who both live and attend school off base. 
Cost of land is an opportunity cost (3% of $16,000 per MFH unit) of the Federal 
government owning the land, but not benefiting from it. The $9,200 total cost of private 
sector housing includes all associated costs including real estate taxes, maintenance, 
utilities, land, depreciation and interest. (CBO, 1993) 
In 1995, DoD spent $4.4 billion in housing allowances for 605,000 military 
families, covering about 80% of service members’ housing costs. That same year, DoD 
spent $2.8 billion to lease, operate and maintain 293,000 MFH units and $724 million 
(MILCON) to construct and renovate MFH units. (GAO, 96-203) Since then, the 
numbers have changed slightly, reflecting a smaller active duty force and a commitment 
to lower/reduce OOP expenses, but BAH still received a disproportionately small 
proportion of the total housing dollars whereas the on-base MILCON/O&M accounts 
received a higher proportion of the housing dollars. In 2000, DoD spent about $750 
million (MILCON), from appropriated MFH funds, to replace or renovate MFH units, 
and $2.8 billion, from the services’ MFH O&M funds, to lease, operate and maintain the 
existing MFH stock. BAH payments totaled $5.2 billion. (BAH Primer, 2002) The 
numbers for 1995 and 2000 demonstrate DoD’s continued but declining skew towards 
on-base housing. In 1995, BAH accounted for 55% of the housing dollars, while 
accounting for 65% of the personnel. On-base housing, supported by MILCON/O&M 
funds, received 45% of the funding to support only 35% of the service members. In 2000, 
BAH accounted for 60% and MILCON/O&M consumed 40% of the housing dollars 
while the ratio of on-base to off-base personnel remained unchanged. DoD still spends 
disproportionately more money to house service members on base than it spends for off 
base housing allowances. 
B.  RELIABILITY OF COST COMPARISONS 
Preparing accurate, reliable cost comparisons of projects financed by military 
construction funding or through privatization is difficult because the comparisons involve 
long-range projections and include many different costs, variables, and assumptions. For 
example, under military construction financing, the military pays the initial construction 
or renovation costs and then pays the annual costs to operate, maintain, and manage the 
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units. The military does not pay monthly housing allowances to occupants since the 
service members occupying the units forfeit their allowances when living in government-
owned housing. In contrast, under most proposed privatization projects, the military 
initially uses some funds and/or conveys some existing military houses or property to 
secure a contract with a private developer. Since the housing is not government-owned, 
the military pays monthly housing allowances to the service members occupying the 
housing and some housing management costs for service member referral services and 
for oversight of the contracts, which in many cases is for 50 years. 
1.  Modest Savings 
DOD notes that privatization provides an advantage over traditional financing by 
requiring less initial government funding to get housing constructed or renovated because 
the private sector provides most of the required funds. Current estimates also predict that 
most proposed projects will result in long-term savings to the government, although the 
average amount is modest—about 11 percent. However, such estimates are difficult to 
make with precision because they include many assumptions and cost estimates over long 
time frames. Before actual privatization costs and savings are known, several projects 
will have to be constructed, occupied, and operated over a period of time.  
Questions that an analysis has to answer: 
1. Will developers operate and maintain privatized housing in accordance 
with the contracts and in a manner that meets servicemembers’ 
expectations? 
2. To increase profits, developers could limit maintenance and repairs and 
cut costs by hiring less qualified managers and staff and using inferior 
supplies. DOD plans to include maintenance standards, modernization 
schedules, required escrow accounts, and other safeguards in each 
privatization contract to help ensure adequate performance. However, 
enforcing the contracts could be difficult, time-consuming, and costly. 
3. Will the housing will be needed over the life of the projects — typically 
50 years. DOD housing officials stated that accurate forecasts of 
housing needs beyond 3 to 5 years cannot be assured.  
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Until several privatization projects have been implemented and occupied and 
experience is gained in the operation of these projects, these concerns and questions will 
remain largely unanswered. 
2.  The Services’ Life-Cycle Cost Analyses Lack Consistency and 
Reliability 
DOD’s draft guidance regarding performing life-cycle cost analyses generally 
identified the costs that should be considered in the analysis of each alternative. 
However, the guidance did not include details on how the estimates for each type of cost 
should be determined. For example, details were not provided on how the costs of the 
contribution of government housing units or other property should be determined. 
Because many proposed projects include the conveyance of government property to the 
developer and the valuation of these assets can be critical to the outcome of the overall 
analysis, detailed guidance in this area could help ensure more accurate and consistent 
analyses. DOD officials stated that for a proposed privatization project to be approved, 
the government’s estimated total costs in present value terms for the project normally 
should be equal to or less than the total costs for the same project financed by military 
construction funding.  The officials stated an exception to the guideline could be 
approved under some circumstances, such as when the total cost difference between the 
options was small but substantially less initial government funds were needed to 
construct the project under privatization. However, DOD had not developed definitive 
guidance for when an exception could be approved. As a result, DOD could not ensure 
that approval decisions for privatization projects with total costs exceeding military 
construction costs were made in a manner that consistently determined what was in the 
government’s best interest. Overall long-term projected savings from privatization are 
modest. Also, because of the deficiencies in the services’ analyses and because DOD had 
not provided guidance on the circumstances that would justify approving privatization 
projects that would cost more than comparable military construction projects, DOD 
cannot ensure that approval decisions for proposed privatization projects are made in a 
manner that consistently determines what is in the government’s best interest. 
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The life-cycle cost analyses prepared by the services to compare proposed 
privatization and military construction projects were inconsistent, inaccurate, and lacked 
support for some assumptions. For example, some analyses did not consider project 
planning costs. Although the amount of government funds needed to initiate housing 
projects under the privatization option can be substantially less than needed under the 
military construction option, this does not necessarily mean that the government’s long-
term total costs for the projects also will be less under privatization because annual costs 
differ under each option. To estimate and compare the government’s long-term costs for 
proposed projects financed through privatization and military construction, the services 
prepare life-cycle cost analyses and use the results to help decide whether proposed 
privatization projects should be approved for solicitation.  
GAO found that analyses with the services’ analyses for 14 projects approved for 
solicitation, were associated with inconsistencies, inaccuracies, and lack of support for 
some assumptions and estimates in every completed analysis. For example, seven 
analyses did not consider costs for project planning and design, three analyses did not 
consider the value of government property conveyed to the developers, two analyses 
included the value of conveyed property but did not provide supporting documentation 
for the estimates used, six analyses did not include costs for monitoring the privatization 
contract, two analyses did not use the correct Office of Management and Budget discount 
rate to adjust for the time value of money, and no analyses were performed for two 
projects. 
GAO review of the 12 life-cycle cost analyses for the 12 projects that had a life-
cycle cost analysis prepared by the services indicates that the long-term savings to the 
government from privatization will be modest. The services estimated for these projects 
that privatization, on average, should cost the government about 12 percent less than 
military construction financing. After recalculating costs, making adjustments to the 
services’ estimates to provide consistency, considering all project costs under both 
options, and correcting other problems, GAO found that privatization, on average, should 
cost the government about 11 percent less than military construction financing. For 10 
projects, the estimated savings ranged from 38 percent to 5 percent. For two projects, 
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Robins Air Force Base and Stewart Army Subpost, GAO estimated that privatization 
would cost more than military construction—about 9 percent and about 15 percent more, 
respectively. DOD officials stated that these projects were still in the best interest of the 
military because with privatization, the housing improvements could be completed faster 
and with substantially less initial government funds.  
Estimated savings  












   Total cost $3,128 $2,755 $373 11.9 
   Average project 
cost 
$261 $230 $31 11.9 
GAO estimate 
   Total cost $3,298 $2,937 $360 10.9 
   Average project 
cost 
$275 $245 $30 10.9 
 
Table 4 – 2: Comparison of Life-Cycle Cost Estimates for 12 Projects 
 
3.  Guidance to Performing Life-Cycle Cost Analyses 
Joseph K. Sikes, Director of the Competitive Sourcing and Privatization Office, 
released a housing privatization life cycle cost policy memo on 11 February 2002. (See 
Appendix F)The stated purpose of the memo is to ensure identified costs are accurate, 
simple and consistent across the military services to facilitate appropriate comparisons 
between identical MHPI and MILCON alternatives. Specific guidance outlines LCC 
estimating methodologies including provisions for utility service, excess BAH recovery, 
out-year renovations, and project planning/inspections. An appendix to the memo 
provided the services with a standardized methodology for calculating consistent and 
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reasonable MILCON O&M costs. Sunk costs are defined as including government - 
owned land and improvement expenditures incurred before project approval and not 
recoverable regardless of the alternative selected. 
4.  Examples of Life-Cycle Cost Analyses 
In its life-cycle cost analysis for the proposed privatization project at Camp 
Pendleton, for example, the Marine Corps compared estimates of the government’s long-
term costs for the project financed through the initiative and with military construction 
funds. Under the privatization option, the developer would build 200 housing units, 
renovate 512 government housing units, and operate and maintain these units for 50 years 
and the government would convey 512 existing government housing units to the 
developer, lease the land for the housing to the developer for 50 years at no cost, provide 
for a portion of the project financing through a direct loan, and pay housing allowances to 
the military occupants of the housing. Under the military construction option, the 
government would pay for the construction or renovation of the 712 units and operate and 
maintain the units for 50 years. The Marine Corps’ analysis showed that privatization 
would cost the government about $28 million, or about 17 percent, less than military 
construction. However, our review found that the Marine Corps did not estimate and 
consider (1) the value of the 512 units to be conveyed to the developer and (2) the costs 
of project development and monitoring the privatization contract. The Marine Corps also 
incorrectly used different discount rates for the two options to adjust for the time value of 
money. After adjusting for these problems and recalculating the government’s costs 
under the two options, we found that privatization was less costly—about $11 million, or 
about 5 percent, less than military construction—but considerably less than the Marine 
Corps’ estimated savings of $28 million. 
According to a Marine Corps official, a life-cycle cost analysis was not prepared 
for the Marine Corps Logistics Base, Albany, Georgia, project because the proposed 
project required no initial government funds. The military would convey to a developer 
419 older, government housing units and a vacant hospital facility located off base. In 
return, the developer would construct 114 housing units on base and operate and maintain 
the units for 50 years. Military members occupying the units would receive housing 
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allowances and pay rent. According to the DOD draft guidance and to officials in the 
DOD office responsible for the initiative, a life-cycle cost analysis should have been 
prepared for this project. 
C.  CONCLUSION 
Because life-cycle cost analyses use numerous assumptions and estimates actual 
costs and savings from implemented privatization projects will vary from the results of 
the analyses. Budgetary consequences from approved projects cannot be known until the 
projects are constructed, occupied, and operated for several years. Nevertheless, 
privatization has a relatively modest effect on total government costs because it shifts 
funding requirements from the military housing construction, operations, and 
maintenance accounts to the military personnel accounts to pay for additional housing 
allowances. Service officials have recognized this and have stated that the long-term 
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V. PRESIDIO OF MONTEREY AND NAVAL POSTGRADUATE 
SCHOOL 
A.  OVERVIEW 
Presidio of Monterey proposed to lease its entire inventory of 2,268 family 
housing units to a selected private sector partner. In exchange, the partner provides 
replacement housing, community amenities, new construction, demolition, long-term 
operation, management and maintenance, and rehabilitation of existing family housing. 
This agreement would exist for a fifty-year period with a twenty-five year renewal clause. 
On 9 July 2002, Congress awarded the Monterey family housing privatization initiative 
to Clark Pinnacle Family Communities LLC and approved the Community Development 
and Management Plan (CDMP) on 30 June 2003, worth $790.8 million during the initial 
development period (ten years) and up to $3.5 billion over the next 50 years. Clark 
Pinnacle Family Communities LLC is a joint business enterprise between Clark Realty 
and Pinnacle Realty Management Company. Headquartered in Bethesda, Maryland; the 
Clark organization is one of the country’s leading real estate companies and the largest 
privately held general building contractor in the nation. Pinnacle Realty Management 
Company is an international real estate investment management firm headquartered in 
Seattle, Washington. Pinnacle provides both multifamily residential and commercial real 
estate owners and investors with a broad scope of realty services, including the 
acquisition, disposition, rehabilitation, property management financing, and repositioning 
of real estate assets. (RCI Newsletter, October 2002) An innovative public-private 
partnership between the U.S. Army, U.S. Navy, and Clark Pinnacle has been formed to 
plan, program, develop, construct, and/or manage a total portfolio of approximately 8,000 
military family housing units in three distinct military communities. Clark Pinnacle is 
currently working with the U.S. Army on development plans for family housing at Fort 
Belvoir in the Washington, D.C. area and Fort Irwin/Moffett/Parks Military Housing in 
California. As noted earlier, Clark Pinnacle recently partnered with both the Army and 
Navy on plans for military housing in Seaside, California. The Presidio of Monterey and 
Naval Postgraduate School venture is the first successful Army-Navy joint privatized 
military housing project. The Army, however, leads the privatization of military housing 
in Monterey through it’s Residential Community Initiative Program. The only contracts 
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involved in this corporate relationship are the $350,000 contract between the Army and 
Clark Pinnacle to produce a Community Development Management Plan and any 
commercial contracts the Corporation lets for specific supplies and services. 
B.  SCOPE OF THE MHPI  
The Monterey Bay Military Housing (MBMH) LLC started fiscal year 2004 with 
the transfer of 2268 units, 1,675 from the Army and 593 from the Navy. It will demolish 
and not replace a 50-unit apartment building on the Presidio. The Defense Language 
Institute will use the land for instructional purposes. Eventually, as the units at La Mesa 
Village are demolished and replaced, they will be spread out a bit, yielding nine fewer 
units. After construction is complete, the MBMH LLC will own and manage 2209 units. 
Demolition and construction will proceed gradually over the next eight years. As a result, 
the new military housing communities will take shape slowly through 2012. 
C.  AUTHORITIES USED IN MONTEREY 
MHPI project in Monterey uses the following three authorities: 
1. The Army and the Navy made their land and existing housing available to 
Monterey Bay Military Housing, LLC for the new housing. All the existing 
housing will eventually be demolished and replaced. 
2. The Monterey developments will also include ancillary facilities 
infrastructure, community centers, community swimming pools, etc. 
3. Rent will be paid through allotment of BAH.  
All three authorities are associated with 0% budget scoring: In effect, using the 
“free” MHPI authorities, Monterey’s RCI Program leveraged the Army and Navy’s 
equity in land and housing to “buy” 49% of Monterey Bay Military Housing, LLC, a 
limited liability corporation which then borrowed $450 million from private lenders to 
finance the new housing in Monterey and Seaside, California. The expected BAH and 
commercial rents represent the cash flow that justifies the loan. (Collier, 2003). That 
corporation then contracted with Clark Pinnacle Military Housing, LLC, to construct and 
manage new housing communities on the Presidio of Monterey, the Naval Postgraduate 
School, La Mesa Family Housing, and the Ord Military Community. Although land is 
expensive in and around Monterey, contributing the land and housing at Ord Military 
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Community, La Mesa Village, and Presidio of Monterey will have no impact on the 
defense budget. Because of budget scoring, DoD’s real property has no budgetary value. 
In contrast, had the Army and Navy contributed the cash value of the land and housing 
for their share in the corporation, the entire cash amount would have been counted as an 
expenditure in the year the contribution was made. This would have required a 
Congressional appropriation. (Else) 
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Figure 5-1: Business Entity in Monterey 
 
 
D.  IMPLICATIONS OF BAH  
In Monterey the availability of private housing provides a real freedom of choice 
both legally and physically to the service members. Essentially the Army and Navy 
offered service members the choice of Government housing with BAH forfeited or full 
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BAH which service members could apply to housing in the commercial rental market. 
Under RCI agreement, service members can choose whether to live in privatized military 
housing or private-sector housing. If a significant proportion of potential renters choose 
to rent private-sector housing, due to recent increase of BAH, the developer’s financial 
projections may require rethinking. Sixty-eight percent of the service members at the 
Naval Postgraduate School and the Defense Language Institute chose to live in La Mesa 
or the Ord Military Community. At NPS significant numbers of international students are 
attending. The RCI agreement regarding the freedom of choice between privatized 
military housing and private-sector housing doesn’t apply to International Military 
Education and Training students. Under IMET the cost and expenses associated with 
training and educating an international student are provided as a military aid and paid for 
by the US. Military. According to earlier regulations all accompanied IMET students 
must live in government quarters (privatized military housing) if available within 45 days 
of arrival. (See Appendix G for guidelines given by IPO) 
E.  ACCESSIBILITY OF HOUSING  
In Monterey, all the new housing, except for historic houses at the Naval 
Postgraduate School and the Presidio, is accessible to the public. In short, the economics 
of the Monterey project is certainly different from that of others. This opens the housing 
market to civilian tenants who might compensate for the loss of revenue due to low 
occupancy rate of military tenants. While in other cases, where military housing is on 
base, thus not accessible by civilians, land and existing housing alone may provide 
insufficient equity to attract corporate partners. 
F.  CASH FLOW FROM OPERATIONS  
The average BAH for the Monterey area is $2000 per month, so the developer 
gains $2000 per month for every rented unit. Theoretically we can calculate with 2209 
units, depending on when the Corporation demolishes the apartment building on the 
Presidio. Of course, that amount must be adjusted for uninhabitable units and for those 
under construction at any time. Depending on the dynamics of the program, it appears 
that on average 220 units will be under construction at any time. That gives us 
approximately 1980 revenue-producing units throughout the construction period. 1980 
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units * $2000/unit/month = $3.96 million/month or $47.52 million/year. In the Monterey 
are approximately 3385 military personnel are eligible for BAH and military housing. On 
average each receives $2000 BAH a month, which totals up to 6.77 million a month, 
81.24 million a year. For FY04 the Army’s entire family housing appropriation is less 
than $450 million. Congress would not appropriate $450 million per year for new 
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G.  INCENTIVES FOR DEVELOPERS  
If the entire amount of BAH was used for construction, property management, 
and servicing the debt, then the private-sector firms would have little incentive to 
participate in RCI’s public-private corporations. According to the Army RCI website fees 
that private sector developers and property managers can collect for participation in RCI 
programs are as follows: 
 
• Property/Asset Management: 3% - 5% of gross rent for available units less 
vacant units. 
• Development Management: 3% - 5% of total projected development cost. 
• Construction Management: 3% to 6% of projected total “hard” cost of 
construction. 
DoD and the contractor negotiate exact fees, including the automatic and 
incentive proportions, during development of the Community Development Management 
Plan (CDMP). The Army’s guidance suggests that a “material proportion” of 
Property/Asset Management and Construction Management Fees should be performance-
based and that the entire Development Management Fee should be “at risk” if the 
developer fails to meet milestones. In Monterey the developer would receive 2/5 of the 
Property Management Fee as an incentive portion of the total fee. 2% is the maximum 
incentive that MBMH LLC can earn. Award of the incentive proportion is based on 
customer service, maintenance response, occupancy, budget, and quality of life, weighted 
equally. Projected costs for the basis of the Development and Construction Management 
Fees are determined during development of the CDMP. They are not actual costs. 
H.  RISK ASSESSMENT 
1. Declining Occupancy Rate 
The military housing occupancy rate in Monterey declined significantly from the 
launching of the project to the end of May 2004. This change has been discovered as the 
project moved forward. This lesson is unique to the Monterey project. While most 
installations maintain a lengthy waiting list for housing, the Monterey housing tends to 
have availability year-round. At Naval Postgraduate School (NPS), students graduate and 
arrive four times a year. Some graduation classes are larger than others. At Presidio of 
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Monterey (POM), students graduate and arrive every 6 to 18 months. The private 
contractor, Clark Pinnacle Family Communities LLC, must achieve a 95% occupancy 
rate to maintain financial success of the project. The present occupational rate is 
significantly lower than the targeted number. The contractor has offered one month’s free 
rent to all active duty military members, who are in a residential lease off base. Clark 
Pinnacle is also willing to pay up to two month’s penalties that may arise by ending a 
current lease (See Appendix H for Memorandum). Clark Pinnacle also applied to 
leveraging its bargaining power and changing its policy regarding the rate that 
unaccompanied students must pay for rent. Pinnacle Housing are not honoring the 
unaccompanied rate for unaccompanied IMET students and charging the accompanied 
rate thus creating a difference in what unaccompanied IMET students are required to pay 
for rent and what they are authorized to be reimbursed for. This prompted a change in the 
International Program Office’s policy regarding making mandatory for all IMET students 
to move in military housing. There is no longer a requirement for IMET students to live 
in Pinnacle Housing, which could contribute to further decline in military housing 




2004 BAH RATES FOR PRIVATIZED GOVERNMENT HOUSING 
Rank Accompanied Unaccompanied Difference 
01 $1,556 $1,156 $400
02 $1,793 $1,461 $332
03 $2,291 $1,701 $590
04 $2,355 $1,998 $357
05 $2,432 $2,117 $315
06 $2,452 $2300 $152
 
Table 5-1: BAH Rates for Privatized Government Housing, 2004 
 
2. Falling Retention 
Another factor that affects Army’s RCI is in inherent to the very basic tasks of the 
military, but often ignored in peacetime. That is the unique risk associated with any 
government action that might reduce the number of potential occupants. In the first six 
months of FY04, the retention rate fell 10 percentage points. From Oct. 1, 2003 through 
March 31, 2004, the Army met only 96 percent of its goal of keeping 25,786 soldiers who 
were eligible to leave. For FY03, the retention figure was 106 percent. Assuming the 
same target goal for FY03, this translates 2579 fewer eligible occupants for Military 
Housing nationwide. The Presidio of Monterey is home to the Defense Language 
Institute Foreign Language Center (DLIFLC), which is the primary foreign language 
training institution within the Department of Defense. The combined Army-Navy MHPI 
in Monterey encompasses the Presidio of Monterey where some 25 languages are taught 
including languages as Modern Standard Arabic, Persian-Farsi, Pashto, Dari, with which 
US. Servicemen can meet only during increased risk operations (Operation Enduring 
Freedom, Operation Iraqi Freedom). We still don’t know the effects of the drop in 
retention rate on demand for Military Housing in the Monterey Area, but can assume that 
it might have a significant one in the long run, especially among enlisted linguists.  
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I. BENEFIT AND COST ASSESSMENT 
1.  Consequences of planning exclusively on historical experience 
MHPI was initiated and launched in Monterey based on historical experience 
related to Military Family Housing and ignoring the fact that another initiative has been 
launched simultaneously. Approximately 68 percent of married service members on the 
Peninsula lived in Military Housing – the highest percentage in the country. Before the 
start of the Army’s RCI evidence of long waiting lists at the Monterey military housing 
office indicated that with the demand for Military Housing that percentage might have 
been higher had more housing units been available. Brad Collier, Deputy Program 
Manager for Monterey’s RCI office, reports that a Housing Needs Assessment of the 
Monterey Area indicates the need for more than 2,209 units but that DoD’s land will 
support no more housing units. (Collier, 10/29) Since than the military housing 
occupancy rate in Monterey declined significantly and there is an increasing availability 
all year round. This was the result of another initiative launched simultaneously and not 
coordinately with the MHPI. In his President’s Management Agenda for FY2002, 
President Bush reiterated his commitment to reducing average out-of-pocket expenses for 
housing to zero by 2005. “This will enable more military families to leave inadequate 
government housing and rent quality private-sector housing in the local communities 
around DoD installations.” As a result of increased BAH and the requirement that all 
occupants of Privatized Military Housing assign their entire BAH to the Clark Pinnacle 
Family Communities LLC as rent, larger percentage of military personnel elected not to 
live in Privatized Military Housing. Service members’ choices may change as BAH 
approaches and equals commercial rents in the area. That in turn leads to higher vacancy 
rates, jeopardizing the profitability of the corporation. 
2. Opportunity Cost of Civilian Tenants 
In expectation of vacancies civilians are expected to occupy some percentage of 
Clark Pinnacle’s Military Housing due to the fact that all new housing, except for historic 
houses at the Naval Postgraduate School and the Presidio, is accessible to the public. 
When developing housing privatization projects, experience has shown that the total 
funds available in developer equity and available private sector financing is normally less 
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than the total development cost. This dynamic creates a development gap which must be 
filled by government contribution. Using different authorities DoD can provide this 
contribution with the conveyance or lease of land and existing housing units, direct loans, 
loan guarantees, investments in nongovernmental entities. The percentage of civilian 
occupation of vacant housing determines the opportunity cost of not using DoD funds 
and financial resources to finance military or military related activities. In Monterey the 
RCI PM offered the land and buildings in the Army’s Ord Military Community and the 
Navy’s La Mesa Village as equity for its 49 percent share in a public-private cooperation, 
called Monterey Bay Military Housing LLC. It is unclear how the conveyance of land 
and existing housing has been valued and monetized in the partnership agreement. If we 
assume that the value of conveyed property is approximately $100 million and further 
assume that 10 percent of the housing units would be offered to civilian occupants, than 
$10 million is the opportunity cost of the transaction. This is the amount that could have 
been spent on military or military related activities rather than on satisfying civilian 
housing needs, had the military sold the appropriate number of housing units and acre of 
land to the market. The Army and Clark Pinnacle worked together to craft a Community 
Development and Management Plan (CDMP). Clark Pinnacle was paid $350 000 for the 
CDMP. Similarly, assuming 10 percent civilian occupancy rate in the Privatized Military 
Housing, than $350 000 * 10 % = $35 000 would go to civilian housing with which DoD 
has nothing to do, let alone to finance it. 
3. Cost Plus Percentage of Cost 
There are dangers and unintended consequences of basing a contractor’s fee on 
the actual or projected costs of a project. The RCI Program Financial/Fee Information, 
describes the Development Management Fee as “. . .between 3% and 5% of the total 
development costs. The amount included in total development costs will be agreed upon 
during the development of the CDMP. . .” Similarly, the Construction Management fee is 
“. . .3% to 6% of the total hard cost of construction. A material portion of this fee should 
be performance based. The amount included in total hard cost will be agreed upon during 
the development of the CDMP for the project. Cost plus percentage of cost contracts 
encourage a contractor to run up costs in order to increase his fee. RCI’s fees are not 
 51
based on actual costs; they are based on projected costs. So, instead of encouraging a 
contractor to incur actual costs, RCI encourages a contractor to inflate his cost estimates 
during the preparation of the CDMP. The incentives in the fees also encourage the 
contractor to inflate his estimates. When the contractor incurs less than his estimates, he 
earns incentives for cost under runs. Without competition, there are no other contractors’ 
estimates with which the winning contractor’s estimates can be compared.  
4. Income Implications of BAH 
 Increasing BAH rates is an effective method to increase overall 
compensation to most service members. Since BAH is not taxed at any level, every dollar 
of BAH increases represents one additional dollar of benefit available to the service 
member. BAH increases directly benefit the two-thirds of all military families who live 
off base whether they actually spend the additional BAH on housing –related expenses or 
other family priorities. Service members living in MFH may not benefit from BAH 
increases. Those living in traditional MILCON housing will not benefit from higher BAH 
rates because their MFH is not funded through BAH. Those living in or moving into 
MHPI units may experience larger or higher quality units, with more amenities than the 
MHPI project would otherwise have under the lower BAH rates. Dual-military couples 
primarily live off-post for economic reasons, with the exception of select senior-ranking 
command positions where service members are generally expected to live on base, in 
“commander’s residences.” Both service members receive BAH at the without-
dependants rate, unless they have one or more non-military dependants, in which case, 
the senior-ranking person of the couple receives BAH at the with-dependants rate. Since 
their combined BAH is substantially more than the cost of renting or owning in the 
civilian market, dual-military couples rarely live in MFH.  
5. Trading BAH for MILCON 
Due to budget limitations Congress would not appropriate $450 million in a given 
year for new housing in Monterey. The Army RCI PM commented that $450 million 
exceeds the Army’s entire family housing appropriation for FY04 and that little or no 
savings will result from shifting the funding from MILCON appropriation to BAH 
(Spigelmeyr, 2003). It is certainly willing to pay $81.24 million per year indefinitely. 
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6. Land Contribution for Free 
 When developing housing privatization projects, government contribution was 
justified on the bases that a gap exist between the private developer’s equity and 
additional available private sector financing. It was assumed at launch of the privatization 
initiative that if the entire amount of BAH had been used for construction, property 
management, and servicing the debt, then the privet-sector firms would have had little 
incentive to participate in privatization projects. This dynamic created a development 
gap, which must be filled by government contributions, most frequently by conveyance 
of land and existing housing units. Increased BAH rates make unnecessary the 
conveyance of land end existing housing units to developer for free. After eliminating out 
of pocket expenses, BAH is designed to be fair for all service members in all locations in 
the United States. The typical service member in a given grade and dependent status at a 
duty station on average will have zero out of pocket expense by 2005. In other words the 
average BAH would be equal to the average market price for rental housing at a given 
location. The increased BAH to meet the market price alone eliminated the financial gap 
between the private developer’s equity and additional available private sector financing, 
making unnecessary and unjustified any further government contribution.   
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VI.  HICKAM AFB, AIR FORCE 
A. OVERVIEW 
Hickam AFB is located at the mouth of Pearl Harbor on the island of Oahu, 
Hawaii. The market area includes southern and central portions of Oahu. The base is 
assigned to Pacific Air Force Command and is home to the 15th Air Base and the 
Headquarters for the Pacific Air Forces. Housing at Hickam AFB is located in three 
residential areas (Capehart, Earhart, and Original areas). Only housing within Capehart 
and Earhart will be privatized. The 36 Original Housing will not be conveyed but will be 
renovated by the Developer.  
 
Figure 6 – 1: Location of Hickam 
B. SCOPE OF THE MHPI 
Original plan using the traditional MILCON methods to address the housing 
needs of service members assigned to Hickam AFB called for constructing, revitalizing 
houses at a rate of 2 projects, 100 housing units each, a year. Housing inventory is 
numbered at approximately 2,640 units. Using traditional MILCON it would have taken 
2,640 units/ 2*100 units = 14 years to complete the project at a cost of $390 million. 
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MILCON funding shortages made it necessary to decrease the planed rate of construction 
and revitalization to one project of 50 units a year, which would have taken 53 years to 
complete. Finally Air Force applied to MHPI tools to address its housing needs at 
Hickam AFB. The Air Force is taking its tentative approach, insisting that privatized 
housing be severable from the main installation, while still relying on MILCON for 
approximately half of its housing needs. 
Hickam AFB project involves a real estate transaction to privatize approximately 
half of the military family housing. (total housing 2,640 units) The Air Force intends to 
lease approximately 238 acres of land for 50 years and convey 1,356 existing housing 
units and other improvements to Actus Lend Lease, a private community development 
company. Once an agreement is signed, Actus Lend Lease will own and operate the 
rental housing development for military families for 50 years, as well as finance, plan, 
design, and construct improvements. After 50 years all improvements reverse back to the 
Air Force, if the original partnership is not extended. This agreement would exist for a 
fifty-year period with a twenty-five year renewal clause. Actus Lend Lease, within 
approximately five years, will construct 638 new units in the Earhart housing area, 
conduct major renovation on 178 Capehart units, and conduct minor renovation on 354 
Capehart units and 186 Earhart units. 
At Hickam real estate transactions for government-owned land, facilities, and 
improvements include a 50-year ground lease and a conveyance of existing housing units 
and infrastructure. In addition, an Operating Agreement will govern operations on the 
site. The real estate agreements will allow the private developer to acquire appropriate 
financing and collect revenues from the housing to help finance the project. Community 
support facilities within the housing area like basketball courts and playgrounds will be 
conveyed to the private developer. Portions of the wastewater, electric, and water systems 
are conveyed. Infrastructure, such as roads, parking areas, sidewalks, street lighting, 
irrigation systems, and drainage systems located within the leased parcels of land will 
also be conveyed to the private developer. Telephone and CATV are available on-site 
from local commercial providers. The Government has available funding for a direct loan 
and a limited loan guarantee for this project if required. The housing allowances, 
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provided to military personnel, who then use those allowances to pay for housing rent 
and utilities, do not count against the available funds for the project. The success of the 
project is based on a long-term commitment between the Air Force and Actus Lend 
Lease.  
Actus Lend Lease plans to conduct four major phases of construction. Minor 
renovation work will be scheduled in a manner to minimize inconvenience to residents:  
Phase One – Commencing 4/2004 and completed 6/2005. 
Demolish 194 units in Capehart, build/replace 178 units in Capehart, build 16 
new units in Earhart, and build housing office & community center. 
Phase Two – Commencing 5/2005 and completed 8/2006. 
Demolish 222 Earhart units and build 266 new units.  
Phase Three – Commencing 8/2006 and completed 9/2007. 
Demolish 214 Earhart units and build 196 new units  
Phase Four – Commencing 9/07 and completed 9/2008. 
Demolish 186 Earhart units, build 160 new units, and build swimming pool and 
recreational sports complex. 
 
Figure 6 - 2: Housing Units to be Privatized (Arrowed) and Actus Lend Lease 
Improvements to be Made. 
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C. DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTION REQUIREMENTS  
Details on what Actus Lend Lease will provide are forthcoming. However, below 
is a minimum of what the company intends to provide:  
1. Community Plan will meet the City and Country of Honolulu codes, 
standards, regulations, and industry practices. Incorporate green space, landscaping, 
underground utilities, and recreation areas to enhance the overall neighborhood 
environment and improve quality of life. Reconfigure existing vehicular and pedestrian 
traffic patterns as needed for new construction. Coordinate utility construction and 
services with local providers. Provide meters as required to allow proper billing of 
responsible parties. Cut curbs to provide handicapped accessibility. Provide tot lots and 
playgrounds  
2. New Construction 
New construction will be modern efficient floor plans incorporating orderly 
arrangement of functions, circulation and open spaces, designs with inviting entrance, 
indoor/outdoor integration and pleasing interior appearance. Insides houses will have 
conveniently interior storage. Kitchens & bathrooms will be modern with well organized 
work area and quality fixtures and finishes, hard finish floor in kitchen, dining area, and 
entry foyer, two full baths and one ½ bath in 3 and 4-bedroom units. House units will be 
a combination of multiplex, duplex, and handicap accessible units. Materials of the 
houses will be durable, low maintenance, and functional materials, equipment, and 
finishes. All houses have central air conditioning with carpet in bedrooms, halls, and 
other living areas, along with overhead lighting in all rooms, also new energy efficient 
appliances included. Furthermore, all houses need to have solar water heating, screen 
doors, exterior trash storage areas screened. 
 3. Perform Major Renovations on 178 Units in Capehart.  
In addition to the major renovation requirements described in the previous 
paragraph, Actus Lend Lease must ensure these homes are architecturally compatible 
with the existing homes in the area.  
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4. Perform Minor Renovations on 540 Units in Capehart and Earhart  
All 540 Houses in Capehart and Earhart will be added with solar water heating 
while 84 Earhart units, 82 Earhart units, and 20 Earhart units will be added with central 
A/C and lanai, roof over lanai and CATV outlets, respectively. 
D. REAL ESTATE MANAGEMENT SERVICES 
 Actus Land Lease will provide a quality property management service, including 
professionally staffed property management office, certified real estate property manager, 
tenant leases/eviction/dispute resolution procedures. The developer will allow tenants to 
provide in-home childcare and operate other in-home businesses, provided they obtain 
applicable permits, allow domesticated pets on premises with no pet deposit. The 
developer will also provide pest control, curbside refuse collection and recycling service, 
all utilities and refuse collection for common areas.  
  RANK  
  O7 O6 O5 O4 O3 O2 O1 E9 E8 E7 E6 E5 E4 E3 E2 E1 Totals 
2BR           63 113 114 33 12 1 336 






4BR        19 43 126 93 107 23 0 0 0 411 
 Totals 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 40 87 257 317 370 230 42 12 1 1356 
 
Table 6 -1: Housing Inventory after Renovation and Replacement Construction 
 
E.  AUTHORITIES USED IN MONTEREY 
Air Force’s project at Hickam AFB uses the following three authorities: 
• The Air Force made their land and existing housing available to Actus 
Lend Lease, LLC for the new housing 
• The Hickam developments will also include ancillary facilities 
infrastructure, community centers, community swimming pools, etc. 
• Rent will be paid through allotment of BAH. 
All three authorities are associated with 0% budget scoring: In effect, using the 
“free” MHPI authorities, Hickam’s MHPI leveraged the Air Force’s land, housing, and 
future BAH to purchase 45% of Hickam Community Housing (HCH) limited liability 
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corporation (LLC), while Actus Lend Lease LLC owns 55% of the corporation. Although 
land is expensive in and around Hickam, Hawaii contributing the land and housing at 
Hickam AFB will have no impact on the defense budget. Because of budget scoring, 
DoD’s real property has no budgetary value. Hickam Community Housing LLC would 
own, operate and maintain Hickam's privatized homes. 
 



















Figure 6-3: Business Entity at Hickam 
 
F.  IMPLICATIONS OF BAH  
In Hawaii although land is limited and  building on land is restricted the 
availability of private housing provides a real freedom of choice both legally and 
physically to the service members. Essentially the Air Force offered service members the 
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choice of Government housing with BAH forfeited or full BAH which service members 
could apply to housing in the commercial rental market. If a significant proportion of 
potential renters choose to rent private-sector housing, due to recent increase of BAH, the 
developer’s financial projections may require rethinking. 
G.  ACCESSIBILITY OF HOUSING  
The Hickam project meets Air Force guidance that requires that housing to be 
privatized be capable of being physically separate from other installation functions. The 
areas that best fit the criteria happened to be those residential areas that are comprised of 
only enlisted homes. This opens the housing market to civilian tenants who might 
compensate for the loss of revenue due to low occupancy rate of military tenants. Only 
when vacancies have exceeded 5 per cent for more than three consecutive months can the 
developer rent to other eligible tenants at market rent rates. The developer could only rent 
enough units to bring the vacancy rate below 5 per cent. The vacancy rate at Hickam has 
historically been less than 2 per cent. Eligible tenants are referred on a priority list: 
• Other active duty military members 
• Federal service employees 
• Retired military members 
• Guard and Reserve military members 
• Retired federal civil service 
• DoD developer employees 
• General public 
H. RENT STRUCTURE  
Military members will receive their basic allowance for housing (BAH) and will 
be offered units designated for their rank at a cost equal to BAH (with dependents). Then, 
military tenants pay rent, which includes refuse collection, water, and sewage, by 
allotment to the developer. Furthermore, tenants pay phone & cable TV charges to 
respective providers. For electricity, it will initially be included in the rent. After meters 
are installed on new or renovated units, the rent will be reduced by 110% of the projected 
electric cost and the tenant will pay for actual electricity used.  
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Initially, electricity, water and sewage costs will be included in the rent. Later on 
residents will pay electricity separately based on individual usage, once utility meters are 
installed at each home and a study is completed to determine the estimated average 
electricity cost per unit. At that time, a portion of the service member’s monthly BAH 
will be set aside as a utility allowance which equates to 110 per cent of the average 
electricity cost for a typical type (junior or senior enlisted) of unit. When all units are 
metered, the rent = BAH – 110 % of the predetermined average cost of utilities for “same 
type” units. If the base electricity cost for unit type = $100 then utility allowance = 1.1 * 
$100 = $110. BAH for an E-6 serviceman is $1,628 in Hawaii region in 2004. Rent for E-
6 = $1,628 - $110 = $1,518. (The Benefits of Housing Privatization) 
The Air Force’s requirement is for Actus Lend Lease, at it’s own expense, to 
make available to tenants, personal property and liability insurance covering up to $40 
000 with a $250 deductible. Tenants must apply for the insurance and be accepted by the 
insurer. 
I.  CASH FLOW FROM OPERATIONS  
The average enlisted BAH (as of 2004) at Hickam AFB is $1530 per month, so 
the developer gains $1530 per month for every rented unit. Theoretically we can calculate 
with 1,356 units. Of course, that amount must be adjusted for uninhabitable units and for 
those under construction at any time. Depending on the dynamics of the program, it 
appears that on average 100 units will be under construction at any time. That gives us 
approximately 1256 revenue-producing units throughout the construction period. 1256 
units * $1530/unit/month = $1.92 million/month or $23.08 million/year. Using traditional 
MILCON for the privatized housing units, that account for approximately half of the 
housing inventory, it would have taken 1,356 units/ 1*100 units = 14 years to complete 
the project at current funding level and would have cost $390/2 = $195 million or 
$195/14 = $14 million a year.   
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Figure 6-4: Cascade of Funds in Hickam Community Housing LLC 
 
J.  INCENTIVES FOR DEVELOPERS 
The BAH is not the entire amount that is used for construction, property 
management, and servicing the debt, the developer has other revenues as well. Similar to 
the Monterey Project at Hickam AFB Air Force and the contractor negotiated exact fees, 
including the automatic and incentive proportions, during development of the 
Community Development Management Plan (CDMP). The developer received $350 000 
for the development of the CDMP. Projected costs for the basis of the Development and 
Construction Management Fees are determined during development of the CDMP. They 
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are not actual costs. The structure of fees that the private sector developer can collect for 
participation in the privatization program is similar to that of the Army RCI’s: 
• Property/Asset Management: 3% - 5% of gross rent for available units 
less vacant units 
• Development Management: 3% - 5% of total projected development 
cost 
• Construction Management: 3% to 6% of projected total “hard” cost of 
construction 
K.  RISK ASSESSMENT 
1. Declining Occupancy Rate 
The military housing occupancy rate at Hickam AFB has historically been more 
than 98 per cent. MHPI was initiated and launched at Hickam based on historical 
experience related to Military Family Housing and ignoring the fact that another initiative 
has been launched simultaneously. Here we can expect the repetition of the lesson that 
we have already learned in the Monterey Project. The military housing occupancy rate 
can decline significantly as the project moves forward. The private contractor, Land 
Lease Actus LLC, must achieve a 95% occupancy rate to maintain financial success of 
the project. The projected occupational rate can be significantly lower than the targeted 
number.  
2. Falling Retention 
Falling retention rate so far has had an effect on the Army rather than the Air 
Force. For the time being we reasonably can not assume that the Air Force could face 
similar problems as the Army does. 
L. BENEFIT AND COST ASSESSMENT 
1.  Planning exclusively on historical experience 
MHPI initiated and launched at Hickam AFB is based on historical experience 
related to Military Family Housing and ignores the fact that another initiative has been 
launched simultaneously. In his President’s Management Agenda for FY2002, President 
Bush reiterated his commitment to reducing average out-of-pocket expenses for housing 
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to zero by 2005. As a result of increased BAH and the requirement that all occupants of 
Privatized Military Housing assign their entire BAH to Actus Land Lease LLC as rent, 
larger percentage of military personnel could elect not to live in Privatized Military 
Housing. That in turn leads to higher vacancy rates, jeopardizing the profitability of the 
corporation. 
2. Opportunity Cost of Civilian Tenants 
In expectation of vacancies civilians are expected to occupy some percentage of 
Actus Land Lease’s Military Housing due to the fact that all new housing is accessible to 
the public. The developer can rent the housing units to civilian tenants at market rent 
rates when vacancy is higher than 5 per cent for more than three consecutive months. The 
developer could only rent enough units to bring the vacancy rate below 5 per cent. The 
partnership agreement between the Air Force and Actus Land Lease LLC included this 
because experience has shown that the total funds available in developer equity and 
available private sector financing is normally less than the total development cost. This 
dynamic creates a development gap which must be filled by government contribution. 
The percentage of civilian occupation of vacant housing determines the opportunity cost 
of not using DoD funds and financial resources to finance military or military related 
activities. At Hickam the Air Force offered the land and buildings in the Earhart and 
Capehart housing area as equity for its 45 percent share in a public-private cooperation, 
called Hickam Community Housing LLC. It is unclear how the conveyance of land and 
existing housing has been valued and monetized in the partnership agreement. If we 
assume that the value of the conveyed property is approximately $100 million and further 
assume that 5 percent of the housing units would be offered to civilian occupants, than $5 
million is the opportunity cost of the transaction. This is the amount that could have been 
spent on military or military related activities other than on satisfying civilian housing 
needs, had the military sold the appropriate number of housing units and acre of land to 
the market. 
 64
3. Cost Plus Percentage of Cost 
There are dangers and unintended consequences of basing a contractor’s fee on 
the actual or projected costs of a project. The RCI Program Financial/Fee Information, 
describes the Development Management Fee as “. . .between 3% and 5% of the total 
development costs. The amount included in total development costs will be agreed upon 
during the development of the CDMP. . .” Similarly, the Construction Management fee is 
“. . .3% to 6% of the total hard cost of construction. A material portion of this fee should 
be performance based. The amount included in total hard cost will be agreed upon during 
the development of the CDMP for the project. Cost plus percentage of cost contracts 
encourage a contractor to run up costs in order to increase his fee. RCI’s fees are not 
based on actual costs; they are based on projected costs. So, instead of encouraging a 
contractor to incur actual costs, RCI encourages a contractor to inflate his cost estimates 
during the preparation of the CDMP. The incentives in the fees also encourage the 
contractor to inflate his estimates. When the contractor incurs less than his estimates, he 
earns incentives for cost under runs. Without competition, there are no other contractors’ 
estimates with which the winning contractor’s estimates can be compared. 
4. Income Implications of BAH 
 Increasing BAH rates is an effective method to increase overall compensation to 
most service members. Since BAH is not taxed at any level, every dollar of BAH 
increases represents one additional dollar of benefit available to the service member. 
BAH increases directly benefit all military families who live off base whether they 
actually spend the additional BAH on housing–related expenses or other family priorities. 
Service members living in MFH may not benefit from BAH increases. Those living in 
traditional MILCON housing will not benefit from higher BAH rates because their MFH 
is not funded through BAH. Those living in or moving into MHPI units may experience 
larger or higher quality units, with more amenities than the MHPI project would 
otherwise have under the lower BAH rates. BAH for an E-6 serviceman is $1,628 in 
Hawaii region in 2004. If the base electricity cost for unit type = $100 then utility 
allowance = 1.1 * $100 = $110, than rent for E-6 = $1,628 - $110 = $1,518. Table 6-1 
shows a comparison between privatized housing and market rent rates. An E-6 service 
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member, choosing to live in a two or three bedroom housing unit, can benefit most from 
BAH increases, when lives off base. When the service member elects to live off base in a 
two, three, or four bedroom apartment, condos, or townhouse, or if he chooses to live in a 
two bedroom single-family home pays rent significantly less than he should pay living in 
privatized military housing. The net benefit, that he can spend on other family priorities 
ranges from $218/month to $768/month. If the serviceman elects to live off base and 
prefers larger and higher quality three or four bedroom single-family rental home with 
more amenities, then he might have to pay the difference between his BAH and the 
market rent out of pocket. This corresponds with previous historical experiences that 
show the most cost-efficient way to solve service member’s housing needs is to rely on 
local private housing. The average BAH in Hawaii is approximately $1,530/month, 
which suggest that a significant portion of the servicemen would choose to live off post 
and benefit from each additional dollar of the increased BAH that they should have spent 
on rent living on post. 
 
Air Force standards, BAH, and market rent comparison table for an E-6 
Standards  2 bedroom 3 bedroom 4 bedroom
Privatized Housing rent (BAH rate – $110) $1,518 $1,518 $1,518 
Average monthly rent in the local community 





$1,100 -  
$1,300 




$418 -  
$218 
Average monthly rent in the local community 
(single-family rental homes) 
$900 $1,350 - 
$2,000 
$1,500 -  
$3,000 
Difference $618 $168 -     
(-$482) 
$18 -       
(-$1,482) 
 
Table 6-2: A Comparison between Privatized Housing and Market Rent Rates 
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The houses are designated as either junior or senior enlisted homes. Members 
who choose to live off base receive their entitled amount regardless of the cost of their 
rent or mortgage. Likewise, members who choose to live on base in privatized housing 
receive and forfeit the same amount of BAH, regardless of the condition or type of unit 
they live in. Because there are only two categories of enlisted homes, servicemen with 
different ranks can fill up the same type of units. Having servicemen in either senior or 
junior enlisted housing units with different ranks generate different revenues (BAH) for 
the developer. It is likely that the developer would tailor the cost of construction and 
operations and management of housing units to meet it’s profit expectations based on the 
lower “income” customer and making an extra profit on the higher “income” customer. 
5. Trading BAH for MILCON 
Due to budget limitations Congress would not appropriate $390 million in a given 
year for new housing at Hickam, but it is certainly willing to pay $23.08 million per year 
indefinitely. The Air Force commented that $390 million exceeds the Air Force’s entire 
family housing appropriation for FY04. This underlines the recurrent justification for 
Military Housing Privatization Initiative, which is that the Government can not provide 
the necessary funding up front and the use of private sector capital can reduce the 
government’s initial outlays for housing revitalization by spreading costs over a long 
term.  
6. Land Contribution for Free 
 When developing housing privatization projects, government contribution 
was justified on the bases that a gap exist between the private developer’s equity and 
additional available private sector financing. It was assumed at the launch of the 
privatization initiative that if the entire amount of BAH had been used for construction, 
property management, and servicing the debt, then the privet-sector firms would have had 
little incentive to participate in privatization projects. This dynamic created a 
development gap, which must be filled by government contributions, most frequently by 
conveyance of land and existing housing units. Increased BAH rates make unnecessary 
the conveyance of land end existing housing units to developer for free. After eliminating 
out of pocket expenses, BAH is designed to be fair for all service members in all 
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locations in the United States. The typical service member in a given grade and 
dependent status at a duty station on average will have zero out of pocket expense by 
2005. In other words the average BAH would be equal to the average market price for 
rental housing at a given location. The increased BAH to meet the market price alone 
eliminated the financial gap between the private developer’s equity and additional 
available private sector financing, making unnecessary and unjustified any further 
government contribution. Increasing BAH rates makes unnecessary the conveyance of 
land end existing housing units to developer for free. 
7. Special benefit for Military Couples 
  A special benefit exists for military members married to military 
members. It may make economic sense to live downtown for two married military 
members because each receives BAH based on their ranks. If they find an affordable 
housing unit, there is a definite opportunity to make a little extra money. Under 
privatization, that same opportunity exists if they live on base. Each member will receive 
BAH in the single rate, but the rent will be based only on the senior member’s BAH with 
dependent rate. 
8. MILCON costs less than MHPI 
Using traditional MILCON for the privatized housing units, that accounts for 
approximately half of the housing inventory, it would have taken 14 years to complete 
the project at current funding level and would have cost $14 million a year, which is 
definitely less than what the Air Force is planning to pay out in form of BAH for it’s 
servicemen, who could live in traditional MILCON housing units otherwise. The 
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VII. CONCLUSION 
It is unclear precisely what impact the privatization program will have on 
infrastructure outlays in either the short- or long term. Some upfront investments still will 
be required. For example, traditional military construction funding still will be needed as 
the seed money for privatization projects and for projects not suitable for privatization. 
Also, until many more units are renovated or built on bases under the program, DOD will 
need substantial outlays to operate and maintain existing units. Finally, as additional units 
become privatized, the O&M savings that DOD realizes largely will be offset by 
increased budgeting for the military personnel account to cover the payment of housing 
allowances to more families. 
Many privatization projects under consideration propose long-term, 50 year 
agreements between DOD and the developer. Such agreements present several risks, 
including increased potential that the housing may not be needed in the future, the 
contractor might not operate and maintain the housing as expected, and civilians might 
occupy on-base housing if it is not fully used by military members. 
A further concern is that DOD may not have optimally integrated the Military 
Housing Privatization Initiative with the other tools available for addressing housing 
problems. DOD several expressed the greater need of use of available housing in local 
communities and launched it’s BAH initiative. Maximizing referrals to such housing is 
important since the government’s annual costs are about $5000 per unit lower on average 
when acceptable and affordable housing can be found in the community than when on-
base housing (either under MILCON or MHPI) is provided. Although sufficient 
quantities of affordable civilian housing are not available at many installations, greater 
adherence to this policy is needed if DOD is to avoid building or revitalizing more 
housing than is needed under both military construction and privatization programs. 
Coordination on housing initiatives (increased BAH, MHPI) appear to be important, 
since housing allowances could rise in some areas, thereby making more local housing 
affordable to service members and lessening the need for renovation and construction. 
Capitalizing on the strength of each housing tool through a more integrated approach is 
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critical for DOD to ensure that the military’s housing needs are met as efficiently as 
possible. 
 Using a combination of MILCON and MHPI projects, DOD plans to eliminate 
inadequate MFH by 2010. While the success or failure of this plan remains to be realized, 
and is highly dependant on both MILCON and BAH funding streams, the likelihood of 
success seems greater than at any time since Capehart. The first thirteen MHPI projects 
achieved an average leverage of over six to one, providing six times as much construction 
or renovation capital as would have been available under MILCON. This leverage is an 
example of MHPI’s ability to dramatically increase the rate of MFH replacement and 
renovation. Although constructions in some cases are only marginally less costly or in 
some cases even more costly than MILCON the need to fix the inadequate housing 
inventory within a reasonable period of time is of equal importance as well. Underlying 
reality is that funding through MILCON has not been available and the paramount benefit 
of privatization is the role that early delivery of adequate housing provides in improving 
the quality of life of service members. And, even if only marginally less costly, MHPI is 
available, whereas the necessary MILCON appropriations are simply not available in 







ALTERNATIVE AUTHORIZATIONS RANKED BY IMPACT ON BUDGET 
 
 Authority Description Benefit Budget 
Scoring 
1. Conveyance or Lease of 






None – 0% of 
land value 













4. Payment by Allotment Guaranteed cash 
stream 
Minimize rent payment 
uncertainty 
None 
5. Loan Guarantees Guarantee of 
private sector loan 
Lower interest rate, 
ensure financing 
Low -4% - 7% 
of loan amount 





30% - 70% of 
loan amount 
7. Differential Lease 
Payments (DLP) 
Pay difference 








8. Investment (Joint 
Venture) 
Equity investment Partnership interest Moderate to 
High – 100% 
of cash equity 
9. Interim Leases Government lease 





High – NPV of 
lease payments 
during interim 
10. Assignment of Members 
(Tenant Guarantee) 
Members assigned 
housing in project 
Forces above market 
occupancy rate 
High – NPV of 
BAH 
11. Build to Lease Contract 
construction, lease 
units 
Central payment by 
DOD (801-like) 
High – NPV 
lease payments 
12. Rental Guarantee  Guarantee of 
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APPENDIX B 
AUTHORITIES IN THE MILITARY HOUSING PRIVATIZATION INITIATIVE 
 
1. Direct loans: The Department of Defense (DOD) may make direct loans to persons in 
the private sector to provide funds for the acquisition or construction of housing units 
suitable for use as military family or unaccompanied housing. (10 U.S.C. 2873(a),(1)) 
2. Loan guarantees: DOD may guarantee a loan to any person in the private sector if the 
proceeds of the loan are used to acquire or construct housing units suitable for use as 
military family or unaccompanied housing. (10 U.S.C. 2873(b)) 
3. Build and lease: DOD may enter into contracts for the lease of military family or 
unaccompanied housing units to be constructed under the initiative. (10 U.S.C. 2874) 
4. Investments in nongovernmental entities: DOD may make investments in 
nongovernmental entities carrying out projects for the acquisition or construction of 
housing units suitable for use as military family or unaccompanied housing. An 
investment under this section may include a limited partnership interest, a purchase of 
stock or other equity instruments, a purchase of bonds or other debt instruments, or any 
combination of such forms of investment. (10 U.S.C. 2875(a),(b)) 
5. Rental guarantees: DOD may enter into agreements with private persons that acquire 
or construct military family or unaccompanied housing units under the initiative to 
guarantee specified occupancy levels or to guarantee specific rental income levels. (10 
U.S.C. 2876)  
6. Differential lease payments: Pursuant to an agreement to lease military family or 
unaccompanied housing to service members, DOD may pay the lessor an amount in 
addition to the rental payments made by military occupants to encourage the lessor to 
make the housing available to military members. (10 U.S.C. 2877) 
7. Conveyance or lease of existing property and facilities: DOD may convey or lease 
property or facilities, including ancillary supporting facilities, to private persons for 
purposes of using the proceeds to carry out activities under the initiative. (10 U.S.C. 
2878) 
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8. Interim leases: Pending completion of a project under the initiative, DOD may provide 
for the interim lease of completed units. The term of the lease may not extend beyond the 
project’s completion date. (10 U.S.C. 2879) 
9. Conformity with similar local housing units: DOD will ensure that the room patterns 
and floor areas of military family and unaccompanied housing units acquired or 
constructed under the initiative are generally comparable to the room patterns and floor 
areas of similar housing units in the locality concerned. Space limitations by paygrade on 
military family housing units provided in other legislation will not apply to housing 
acquired under the initiative. (10 U.S.C. 2880(a),(b)) 
10. Ancillary supporting facilities: Any project for the acquisition or construction of 
military family or unaccompanied housing units under the initiative may include the 
acquisition or construction of ancillary supporting facilities for the housing. (10 U.S.C. 
2881)) 
11. Assignment of members of the armed forces to housing units: DOD may assign 
service members to housing units acquired or constructed under the initiative. (10 U.S.C. 
2882) 
12. Lease payments through pay allotments: DOD may require service members who 
lease housing acquired or constructed under the initiative to make lease payments by 




AIR FORCE PROJECTS AWARDED AS OF 31 MAY 2004 
 
Lackland Air Force Base, Texas 
Awarded August 1998 to Landmark Organization. This project involved $42.6 million to 
construct 420 new units at Lackland Air Force Base in San Antonio, Texas. This project 
is complete. 
Robins Air Force Base, Georgia 
Awarded September 2000 to Hunt Building Corporation. This project involved $56.5 
million to construct 370 new units and renovate 300 units at Robins Air Force Base in 
Warner-Robins, Georgia. This project is completed. 
Dyess Air Force Base, Georgia 
Awarded September 2000 to Hunt Building Corporation. This project involved $35.3 
million to construct 402 new units off base for Dyess Air Force Base in Abilene, Texas. 
This project is completed. 
Elmendorf Air Force Base, Alaska 
Awarded March 2001 to Aurora Military Housing and Hunt Building Corporation. This 
project involved $91.7 million to construct 420 units, renovate 200 units, and demolish 
176 units. This project is scheduled for completion in September 2003. 
Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio 
Awarded August 2002 to Properties of Wright Field (Miller-Valentine, Woolpert, Hunt 
Building Corporation). This is the largest housing privatization project in Air Force 
History, involving 1,536 houses. The deal included $99.1 million to privatize these 
houses at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base in Dayton/Springfield, Ohio. 
Kirtland Air Force Base, New Mexico 
Awarded April 2003 to Hunt Building Company. This project involved $150.6 million to 
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APPENDIX D 
ARMY PROJECTS AWARDED AS OF 31 MAY 2004  
 
Fort Carson, Colorado. 
Awarded September 1999 to J.A. Jones. Fort Carson is the DoD's first housing 
privatization project for an entire installation. J.A. Jones Community Development 
Company assumed responsibility for a $228.6 million dollar project to renovate 1,823 
existing units and construct 840 new units on the installation in Colorado Springs, 
Colorado. Transfer of operations took place in November 1999. 
Fort Hood, Texas 
Awarded October 2001 to Lend Lease Actus. Lend Lease Actus assumed operations at 
Fort Hood in Killeen, Texas on April 2002. This is the largest housing construction and 
renovation project in the history of the military services. The initial project involves $260 
million towards the construction of 973 new housing units and renovation of 4,939 homes 
at Fort Hood. 
Fort Lewis, Washington 
Awarded December 2001 to EQR Lincoln Properties. The developer will revitalize or 
replace 3,218 units, construct 345 new units, and improve neighborhood amenities at Fort 
Lewis near Tacoma, Washington. Transfer of operations occurred April 2002. 
Fort Meade, Maryland 
Awarded December 2001 to Picerne Military Housing. Picerne Military Housing will 
construct 2,748 units, renovate or repair 422 units, and improve neighborhood amenities 
at Fort Meade near the Washington-Baltimore corridor. The developer assumed 
operations in May 2002. 
Fort Bragg, North Carolina 
Awarded May 2002 to Picerne Military Housing. The project will result in the 
construction of approximately 3,050 new or replacement housing units, renovation of 
1,815 housing units and the construction of 11 new community centers, as well as a host 
of other ancillary facilities and amenities to meet the family housing needs at Fort Bragg. 
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Presidio of Monterey/Naval Postgraduate School, California 
Awarded October 2003 to Clark/Pinnacle Family Communities, LLC. The project will 
result in the construction of approximately 2,209 new or replacement housing units, and 
renovations. 
Fort Stewart, Georgia 
Awarded November 2003 to GMH Military Housing. The developer will revitalize or 
replace 3702 units at the military base. 
Fort Campbell, Kentucky 
Awarded December 2003 to Lend Lease Actus, LLC. The developer will revitalize or 
replace 4255 units at the military base. 
Fort Belvoir, Virginia 
Awarded December 2003 to Clark Pinnacle Family Communities, LLC. The developer 
will revitalize or replace 2070 units at the military base. 
Fort Irwin/Moffett Field/Parks Training Area, California 
Awarded March 2004 to Clark Pinnacle – California Military Communities, LLC. The 























NAVY AND MARINE CORPS PROJECTS AWARDED AS OF 31 MAY 2004  
 
Kingsville Naval Air Station, Texas 
Awarded July 1996 to Landmark/Capstone. The 15-year project required the construction 
of 404 new units off base for the Kingsville Naval Air Station near Corpus Christi, Texas. 
This project is completed. Awarded November 2000 to Hunt Building Corporation. The 
project required the construction of 150 units. 
Everett Naval Station, Washington 
Awarded March 1997 to Arlington/Dujardin. This is a 10-year deal worth $20 million to 
construct and privatize 185 new units off base at Everett Naval Station in Everett, 
Washington. This project is completed. Awarded December 2000 to Gateway/Pinnacle 
Family Communities, LLC. This is a 30-year deal to construct 288 new units on private 
land. 
Camp Pendleton Marine Corps Base, California 
Awarded November 2000 to Hunt Building Corporation. This 50-year project included 
$83 million to privatize 712 new units at Camp Pendleton Marine Corp Base in 
Oceanside, California. Phase II: Awarded September 2003 to Hunt/Fluor Lincoln Clark 
Family Communities, LLC. This project constructs and revitalizes 4534 housing units. 
San Diego Naval Complex, California 
Phase I: Awarded August 2001 to Lincoln Property Company and Clark Realty Capital. 
This 50-year project involved $261.8 million for 3,248 units at the San Diego Naval 
Complex near San Diego, California. Phase II: Awarded May 2003 to the same 
contractors. This project involved $421.5 million for 3,302 units at same location. 
New Orleans Naval Complex, Louisiana 
Awarded October 2001 to Louisiana Navy Family Housing and Patrician Asset 
Management Company. This 50-year deal involved $79.8 million for 935 units at the 
New Orleans Naval Complex near New Orleans, Louisiana. 
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South Texas Naval Complex, Texas 
Awarded February 2002 to South Texas Military Housing and Landmark Organization. 
This 50-year deal involved 661 units at South Texas Naval Complex in two locations: 
Corpus Christi Naval Air Station and Ingleside Naval Station. 
Beaufort Marine Corps Air Station, South Carolina 
Awarded March 2003 to Lend Lease Actus. This 50-year project involved 1,718 units at 
Beaufort Marine Corps Air Station, Marine Corps Recruit Depot, and Naval Hospital in 
Beaufort, South Carolina. Lend Lease Actus will renovate 1,227 existing units, replace 
331 units, and construct 160 new units. 
Hawaii Regional, Hawaii 
Phase I: awarded April 2004 to Ohana Military Communities, LLC. This 50-year project 






























LIFE CYCLE COSTS 
 
1. INTRODUCTION  
The Army has developed life cycle cost analyses for 28 privatization candidate sites (see 
Table J-1). These analyses are based on the potential project scopes shown in Table 2-1 
and notional development plans. During concept development, each site will be fully 
analyzed in detail in accordance with procedures approved by the Office of the Secretary 
of Defense (OSD).  
2. APPROACH  
This analysis compares the present value of the total life cycle cost for two alternatives 
and seeks to identify the more economical of the two, from the Government perspective. 
The Military Construction (MILCON) Alternative is shown in the table as “AFHC”, or 
“Army Family Housing Construction”. The Privatization Alternative is shown in the table 
as “RCI”, for Residential Communities Initiatives. Because life cycle cost analyses are 
decision-making tools for the Government, all costs reflected in these analyses are 
Government costs and shown in constant, FY 2002 dollars. Some considerations for these 
analyses are:  
• Army Family Housing Operations (AFHO) costs for the MILCON/AFHC Alternative 
in this comparison were prepared according to OSD policy released on February 6, 
2002.  
• Government expenditures for the entirety of a development scope (AFHC) are 
identical to that assumed for the Privatization Alternative. These expenditures were 
based on the differential between the new unit cost expected under each Alternative.  
• Single largest cost to the Government under the Privatization Alternative is the Basic 
Allowance for Housing (BAH) paid to military residents over the life of the project.  
• Other Government costs under the Privatization alternative include the Community 
Development and Management Plan (CDMP) purchase price, the cost of 
oversight/asset management, fire and police protection attributable to family housing, 
and any equity investment taken by the Government in the privatization entity.  
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• Although both alternatives incur school impact aid, this is a "wash cost" and does not 
affect the relative ranking of the two alternatives.  
3. SUMMARY  
This analysis shows that the Privatization alternative is less costly over the life cycle than 
the MILCON/AFHC Alternative for all FY 2002 to FY 2005 privatization candidates.  
 





GUIDELINES ON THE NEW HOUSING POLICIES AND COST FOR 
STUDENTS RECEIVING AN IMET LIVING ALLOWANCE 
 
All accompanied IMET students receiving the US Living Allowance must live in 
government quarters if available within 45 days of arrival. 
 
If your family is not here yet, but will be joining you, you must live in government 
housing if available within 45 days of your family’s arrival. If you are single/geographic 
bachelor, you are eligible for government housing on a space available basis.  Please see 
the Housing Office for the rates for singles/geographic bachelors. 
 
Effective 1 October, if you are living in what is now referred to government housing, 
your housing rents will increase based on your Basic Allowance for Housing (BAH), 
which is determined by your rank. 
ENS/2LT   - $1311/month 
LTJG/1LT  - $1543/month 
LT/CPT    - $2203/month 
LCDR/MAJ  - $2342/month 
CDR/LTC   - $2432/month 
CAPT/COL  - $2452/month 
RADM/BGEN – $2481/month 
 
Because your rent is due at the beginning of the month, and you are reimbursed (based on 
your receipts), at the end of the month, we have received authorization to process a one-
time advance against your living allowance in order for you to pay the first rent at the 
new rate on 1 Oct 03. 
 
If you need an advance on your living allowance in order to insure the correct amount of 
funds are in your account for the 1 Oct 03 payment, please see Cindy on 22 or 23 Sep 03.  
If you do not do so by the 23rd, it could result in a delay of your advance being processed, 
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and the EFT of the rental amount may create the possibility of insufficient funds in your 
account.  Please note – if at any time your account has insufficient funds to make the EFT 
transfer, you will be responsible for all penalty charges incurred (for both the bank and 
RCI Pinnacle).  (penalty for Pinnacle – 1 day late $50; $5 for each day thereafter) 
 
REGARDING ELECTRONIC FUND TRANSFERS (EFT) – you are NOT required to 
pay your rent via EFT.  However, if you choose to pay your rent in person (as you 
currently are doing), you will be required to pay a security deposit of ½ of the cost of 
your monthly rental rate, plus your rent for the first month.  Late penalty charges will be 
incurred as noted the previous paragraph. 
 
RCI Pinnacle will be providing our office with a copy of your rental receipt, which means 
you will no longer be required to do so. 
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APPENDIX H 
ONE MONTH’S FREE RENT 
 
The Parks at Monterey Bay is currently offering one month's free rent to all active 
duty military members, who are in a residential lease off base.  We would enjoy having 
the opportunity to house you and your family.  If you are currently living out in town, we 
can help to get you out of your lease to come reside with us.  We will also pay up to two 
month's penalties that may arise by ending your current lease. 
 
Advantages to being a resident at the Parks: 
• Quick move-in with no deposit required.  And you will not have to come to our 
office each month to pay rent; we can set up an allotment to have the payment 
taken from your account. 
• 24/7 Maintenance staff available to help residents.  With a quick telephone call, 
we will arrange for someone to come to your house to fix any problem that arises. 
• Location:  La Mesa is located within bicycle or walking distance to NPS.  Ord 
Military Community is close to Highway 1 and has the Commissary close by. 
• Community Events:  We invite all of our residents to join us for our upcoming 
special events:  Holiday events, Concerts in the park, etc.  Join your neighbors for 
some fun and have a friendly competition for our Yard of the Month! 
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APPENDIX  I 
UNACCOMPANIED RATE NOTE JANUARY 04 
 
It has been brought to our attention that Pinnacle Housing will not be honoring the 
unaccompanied rate for unaccompanied IMET students receiving an IMET Living 
Allowance.  For those of you who are living in Pinnacle Housing and your families 
are not yet here, this is going to create a difference in what you will be required to 
pay for rent and what you are authorized to be reimbursed for.  Until your family 
arrives, w are only authorized to reimburse you at the unaccompanied rate. 
 
In order to give you time to remedy the situation, i.e, either bring your family here earlier, 
or find housing downtown, we are going to waive the reimbursement of the 
unaccompanied rate through the end of March.  This gives you 60+ days to bring your 
family in earlier, or find alternate housing if you so choose.  Your lease at Pinnacle is 
month-to-month, so if you decide to move out, you may do so; you will just need to give 
them a 30 day notice in writing. 
 
If you choose to remain in housing after 1 April 04 and your family has not yet joined 
you, you will be reimbursed at the unaccompanied rate even though you may be paying 
the accompanied rate to living in Pinnacle Housing. 
 
Single Students/Geographic Bachelors are eligible to live in “single officer housing” at 
Pinnacle.  There is a different price structure for single officer housing based on location 
of house, and number of bedrooms.  Because of the maximum reimbursement of $75/day, 
there is the possibility that you may not be reimbursed for the entire amount of your rent 
depending on where you are living. 
  
Note:  There is no longer a requirement for students receiving an IMET Living 
Allowance to live in Pinnacle Housing.  If you would prefer to live downtown, that is an 
option available to you.  You will be reimbursed up to $75/day for rent.  Again, if you 
choose to move out of Pinnacle Housing, you will be required to provide them with a 30 
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written notice of intent to vacate.  If you move, you will need to provide our office with a 
copy of your new lease and your rent receipts as required each month. 
 
EFT:  Some of you are still having problems with the EFT withdrawal of your rent.  It is 
very important that you make sure you have sufficient funds in your account.  The EFT is 
set for the 3rd of each month and will happen that day regardless of whether you have 
enough money in your account or not.  Please remember, EFT is an option, it is not 
required.  You may choose to pay your rent in person each month (vice using EFT).  If 
you choose to pay your rent in person, you will be required to pay a one-time security 
deposit of ½ month’s rent. 
 




04 BAH RATES for Privatized Government Housing  
 ACCOMPANIED UNACCOMPANIED   Difference 
01 $1,556 $1,156   $400 
02 $1,793 $1,461   $332 
03 $2,291 $1,701   $590 
04 $2,355 $1,998   $357 
05 $2,432 $2,117   $315 
06 $2,452 $2,300   $152 
 
*The difference is the amount between what you will be paying, and what you will be 
receiving in your pay at the end of each month. 
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